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This study develops a method to analyze and predict
rural insurgencies in the third worLd. First it derives a
causal model and a process model of insurgency from social
science theories and empirical studiss. The aodels help to
identify and organize twenty-eight analytical factors
describing the society, physical environment, government,
and the insurgents. The factors calculate the government-
insurgent balance in organization, legitimacy, and coercion.
An analyst using the methodology evaluates each factor that
is relevant zo the current phase of the insurgency and
reocrds his responses on a factor soaie. The scales are
isomorphic, extending from conditions of government to
insurgent advantage, and are arrange! in parallel on a work-
sheet. Connecting the seLectei points produces a graph that
suggests the status of the insurgenoy. The analyst: may
overlay different worksheets to determine change over time
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Few problems confronting the intelligence analyst today
recur with such frequency, variety, and telling effects as
does insurqency—defined hare as a nass-based, rural move-
ment seeking political power through violence. Ten of the
world's thirteen deadliest conflicts over the past century
and a half have been civil wars or rsbellions [caf. 1], and
one source records 367 "r evolutions" during the first 65
years of this century [ref. 2]. Since 1960, Africa alone
has experienced twelve civil wars [ ref . 3]. There are
active movements today in Si Salvador, Angola, Mozambique,
the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, IndDchina, the Philippines,
and more.
Although few would argue with Charles Tilly that
"collective violence is normal" "r=f. 4], there is no
consensus on the terminology to describe, nor causes to
"explain," these civil wars, rebellions, and revolutions.
Sam Sarkesian discusses more than 38 overlapping terms
including revolution, guerrilla warfare, people's war, and
insurgency [ref. 5], whils Monte Palaer and William Thompson
despair that "one person's riot may wall be another person's
civil war." [ref. 6] Each of the social sciences has
spawned its own theories of poLitical violence, and
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interdisciplinary efforts have failed to reconcile the
conflicting theories and empirical evidence.
This paper aims at structuring a methodology to analyze
insurgencies--bo th communal and class conflicts. It should
be as applicable to the factious civil wars of Africa as to
the revolutions more typical cf Asia. A systematic check-
list of factors describes the social and physical
environment, the government, and the insurgent movement, and
a step-by-step procedure evaluates the factors in turn.
Worksheets record and visually depict each judgement to aid
in making an overall assessment. A user may overlay the
sheets to look for changes over time or to compare different
movements. l
A. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
Insurgency presents four successive challenges to the
intelligence analyst. Each involves evaluating a complex
array cf data and calls for the prediction of specific
developments or events.
1. Prior to the existence of an insurgent movement, the
analyst must evaluate the country's vulnerability
1 It should be clear at the outset that This is not an
exercise in guantified political analysis, of which the
intelligence analyst tends to be skeptical. * ref . 7] with
key variables disputed, factor weights unknown, and many




and predict a group' s appearance.
2. Once a potential iisurgent movement exists, he must
anticipate an armed uprising.
3. Throughout the straggle, he constantly reevaluates
the prospects of insurgent success and tries to
predict the outcome.
4. Finally, if the insurgents win, he must anticipate
the type cf regime they will install.
Is insurgency predictable, or does the analyst face an
impossible challenge? In Switzerland in January 1917, Lenin
reportedly doubted whether "we, the old [will] live to see
the decisive battles of the coming revolution." [ref. 8 ] If
the leader of the Russian Revolution could be so wrong just
weeks before the event, the difficult task of prediction-
might indeed seem intimidating.
The challenge certainly has discouraged some scholars.
David Schwartz believes that "we have nothing like an
adeguate understanding of these incidents" [ref. 9], and
Chalmers Johnson insists that "It is intrinsically impos-
sible to construct a statistical measure that will predict
the occurrence cf a revolution." "ref. 10]. However,
others are more hopeful. John Lewis finds that "Comparison
appears to offer a proaising approach to.
..
questions on
Asia's revolutions." [ref. 11]
12

This paper surveys t hs literature 2 on political violence
with only limited goals in mind. It seeks a procedure to
examine rigorously insurgent situations and to make use of
indicators that aid prediction.
Section II begins to construct a framework of concepts
and indicators by considering a simple causal model of revo-
lution. It identifies the indepenl en t, intervening, and
dependent variables which cause, mediate, or result from the
insurgent process. "Discontent," the result of political
ani socioeconomic circumsfc ances, creates a potential for
insurgency. "Legitimacy" and "coercion" intervene to shape
that potential. An Insurgency either results or it does
not; it succeeds or it fails.
We find that discontent makes a poor variable for a
model intended for practical a pplici tions. Discontent is
everywhere in the third world today, yet insurgencies only
break out here and there. It is i difficult variable to
observe and measure for it exists in people's minds. And
scholars argue over whether the causes of discontent actu-
ally galvanize or demobilize the discontented. Ihe model we
ultimately select does not disregard this important variable
but subsumes it into the others.
2 Tc sample the literature, one might begin with the
review articles by Goldstone [ref. 12], Zagorin [ ref
.
13],
Stone fref. 14], Freeman * ref. 15], and PcweLl [ref. 161.
Excellent anthologies in the field aire by Daviee [ref. 17],
Eckstein [ref. 18], and by Kelly and Brown [ref. 19]. A.
useful comparative study i= bv Sreene [ref. 20].
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A second change to the causal model is to add the vari-
able "organization.
"
Insurgency is a drawn-out and
large-scale affair. Without organization the insurgent
leaders could never rouse traditionally passive peasants to
rebel, and lacking organization they certainly could not
win
.
Because organization, legitimacy, and coercion are so
telling, we propose to compare the government and the
insurgents--or any two sides in an insurgency--on the basis
of these three criteria. The relati/e "balances" of organi-
zation, legitimacy, and coercion break down into
twenty-eight components oc "factors." The rationale here is
simple: it is easier to evaluate each of the twenty-eight
factors one at a time, and then to recombine them, than it
is to assess the entire situation in all its complexity.
Section III presents an overview of the twenty-eight
analytical factors and four phases of an insurgency that are
the basic elements of the framework. The factors describe
the situation (the society and the physical environment)
,
the government, and the insurgent movement. Each actually
represents a cluster of related concerns rather than a
specific, narrow item. The factors ire general enough to be
applicable across a variety of countries and conditions, yet
sufficiently precise to be evaluated accurately. They make




Section IV discusses each of tha situational factors in
seme detail, and Section 7 does the same for those
describing the government and the insurgents. The paper
attempts to justify each factor with arguments drawn from
the literature.
The procedure reguires a user t:> make each of the many
separate decisions called for and to record his judgements
on one of the worksheets provided. The organization of the
framework and the technigue of using visual scales on the
worksheets enable combining the judgements toward an overall
evaluation.
Each factor has an accompanying scale on which to record
an evaluation of that factor. The scales are isomorphic,
running from an endpoinr signifying government advantage or
stability to one representing an insurgent advantage or
instability. Any point oa tha scaLss suggests a degree of
advantage to one or the other rival, although an indetermi-
nate, mid-range value also is possible. Since the
worksheets arrange the scales in parallel, the locus of
points selected forms a graph of tha overall advantage, if
any.
The procedure is fully transparent, enabling a user to
add, delete, or tailor factors to fit local conditions or
his own convictions. The scai=s and worksheets are
optional. Because the scales are of equal length, they
weight the factors equally. A concerned user can accord
15

greater or lesser weight t3 individual factors as he prefers
(perhaps by redrawing the scales to different lengths while
continuing to array then in paralLel with all midpoints
along a vertical centerline).
The framework is intended to have four worthwhile prop-
erties. It is rigorous yet flexible, reproducable, and
visually aided- Rigor ensures completeness; the procedure
provides a systematically constructed checklist of items to
be evaluated. The factors may be flexibly tailored to the
circumstances of specific situations. Successive iterations
can be compared 3 to provide a reliable measure of change.
In fact, an analyst might periodically "take the tempera-
ture" of his country or insurgency to see if incremental
developments have shifted the overall situation appreciably.
Finally, the visual dispLay comprehends a great deal of
material and suggests implications that traditional methods
might miss.
3 Because many of the factors rail for a guaiitative
judgement, and no "objective" standards are imposed upon the
analyst (they would unavoidably be controversial and diffi-
cult to apply uniformly), there is a limitation en use of
the methodology. A. comparison of "Snith's" assessment of an
insurgengy done six months ago, and ''Jones's" just-ccmpleted
evaluation is not necessarily meaningful. The same indi-
vidual must complete both evaluations in any comparison, and
he must come close to applying the same standards each time.




Section VI concludes the paper iith some illustrations
of applying the procedure and with the blank worksheets.
Tha historical case of tha Malayan •Emergency" (19U8-1960)
shows how the methodology tests for trends over time, which
are often more significant than the absolute values of tha
factors at any given moment. The current situations in tha
Philippines and Mozambigia provida two more looks at tha
framework in action.
In sum, the paper presants little that is new and
attempts to prove nothing. Instead, it surveys theoretical
and historical scholarship to assemble many apparent lessons
of insurgency. Although the discussion concentrates upon
Southern Africa and Southeast Asia, the approach is intended
to be applicable throughout the third 'world. The paper
includes aids for recori-taeping and graphic representation
of the assessment.
B. INSURGENCY DEFINED
In defining "insurgency," we dra* upon the same criteria
used to define and dif f ar entiate many forms of political
violence. These are:
1. The goals of the movement. A dissident group may
intend to alter the political and social system at
any of five levels: those of the leaders, policies,
political institutions, iiaoiogy, and social
17

structure [ref. 21]. Thus, Samuel Huntington's is a
"maximal" definition of revolution: it is "a rapid,
fundamental and violent domestic change in the domi-
nant values and myths of a society, in its political
institutions, social structure, leadership, and
government activity and policies." [ref. 22] On the
other hand, Crane Brinton prefers a "minimalist"
definition. "Our focus is on the drastic, sudden
substitution of one group in charge of the running cf
a territorial political entity by another group
hitherto not running that government •-" "ref. 23]
2. Participation. Participation varies from tiny
conspiracies within the ruLing elite to tens of
millions of people involve! Ln political and social
revolutions.
3. The duration and level of violence. Charles Tilly
suggests that "The Largest disparities in definitions
of revolution come frcn the time spans the definers
want to cons ider. . . . In general, the longer the time
span, the fewer the events that will qualify as
revolutions." [ref. 24]
4. External intervention. This is the direction or
support of a group by others outside the country.
5. Outcome. Success or failure is a common cri-erion.
Revolution may simply mean successful rebellion.
13

We define an insurgency, as the process by which a mass-
participation movement Located primarily in the countryside
uses paramilitary units to wage guerrilla or conventional
warfare for the purposs :>£ taking political power from an
established regime. Although its leaders typically will
come from the society's s ocioecononically mora advantaged
students, intellectuals, professionals, tradesmen, offi-
cials, and so forth, the movement will recruit its followers
from among the farmer and worker masses. The group must be
seeking political power through violance. Its goal may ba
sovereignty over the entira state (a.i attempt at revolution)
or only over a portion of it (a secession). The group must
possess the organization and rasourcas to wage guerrilla or
conventional warfare. Thus, we evaliata insurgent movements
in terms of membership, area concentration, goals, and
tactics.
Revolutions tend to ba insurgencies, as do civil and
"internal" wars, but most coups and international conflicts
do not. Insurgency is ganerally lirge-scale and domestic
political violence. Although insargsnts are necessarily
dissidents, and they oftea employ terrorism and urban guer-
rilla tactics, small groups of political dissidents or
terrorists 4 do not gualify as insurgant movements.
It is particularly important to distinguish insurgency
from terrorism. Although i r.ter natioi ai terrorism is a major
problem for the intelligence community, it is actually rare
in the third world. A study done with the aid of the RAND
19

C. APPLYING ACADEMIC RESEARCH TO INTELLIGENCE
Richard Heuer, a 27-year vatsran with the Central
Intelligence Agency, believes that "there are, of course,
very many similarities between academic and governmental
research.... There are also significant dif fereaces. " [ref.
27] While seeking to capitalize on the similarities, we must
also consider the following differences.
First, the analyst is concerned with making probabil-
istic forecasts that are more near-term and event-oriented
than are the predictions that interest many scholars.
Second, academic models strive for "parsimony and elegance,"
sometimes to the extent that "accuracy is both indeterminate
and inconsequential." "ref. 28] Models that try to get the
maximum explanatory value from the fewest possible variables
must be enriched with detail to oe useful to the analyst.
Corporation's computerize! data base on terrorist acts
committed from 1963 througa 1974 (i. =. , the "ITERATE" data
bank, an acronym for "International Terrorism: A-tributes of
Terrorist Events") concludes that ''transnational terrorism
is an oddity rather than a serious problem for Africans and
Asians...." [ref. 25] Insargent leaders resemble terrorists
in socioeconomic profile, and frequently in tactics, but the
crucial distinction concerns mass participation in the move-
ment. Isolated groups of elites are simply not as capable
as are mass movements. \s Gary Dlson observes, "in most
cases, workers, students, and intellectuals cannot succeed
in toppling the government by themselves." [ref. 26]
Terrorism thus differs £r:>n insurgency in membership, goals,
scale, and other aspects, and it requires analysis of
factors different from those stressed here.
2D

and certainly accuracy is paramount. Third, the analyst
(ideally) should not be prone to parochial concern for a
specific discipline's priiciples aid concepts. What is
desired is a pragmatic appr oach--either interdisciplinary or
employing simultaneous, competing models as checks on each
other. And fourth, cross-national tools of research favored
by many in the academic world are generally of less utility
to the analyst than are techniques for examining absolute
criteria, developments, aid trends within a single country.
To the extent possible, this paper recognizes and
adjusts for these differences of perspective. It addresses
the time horizon of the analyst rather than that of the
historian, but the methodology cannot predict specific
events. The framework does not favor a single discipline,
and it is enriched with indicators 5 that are different from
the "causal variables" favored by scioiars. Finally, tech-
niques that compare and rank numbers of states, such as the
quantified, composite indioes of the Feierabends [ref. 30],
or Donald Morrison [ref. 31 ], are not included here.
5 Karl Deutsch defines indicators as "telltales." They
are "things that are easy to observe and that ace coupled or
linked supposedly or in reality to other things that are
harder to observe, but wiich we coisider important." They
need not be causes; in faot, it is not necessary that they
have any particular link to the phenomenon under study
except that the indicator tends to appear whenever the
phenomenon does. Thus, indicators are "tools of discovery,
tools for directing our attention and curiousity. " They
prove nothing. "No single indicator can be trusted." They




Section II constructs a simple causal model of insur-
gency by building upon academic theories of political
stability and revolution. It isolates several variables and
considers their utility for practical applications. In so
doing, the concept of discontent, and the classic psycholog-
ical theories of revolution, are rejected in favor of a
scheme that focuses upon the variables of organization,
legitimacy, and coercion.
A,' ARISTOTLE'S "DISCONTENT, LEGITIMACY, AND COERCION"
Aristotle apparently developed the first causal model of
revolution and identified the key variables of discontent,
legitimacy and coercion. He observed that people became
discontented whenever what they possessed was less than what
they believed they were lie, especially regarding economic
and political power. That is, whenever people enjoying a
measure of the one lacked a commensurate amount of the
other, they became discontented. But before this condition
could translate into revoLt, Aris-otle observed that the
mediating variables of legitimacy and coercion came into
play. Thus, the philosopher advised that a ruler had two
means of protecting himself against an overthrow: he could
22

rely upon fores, or he could rule in such a manner that the
people would "think that it is tha tyrant's power which
serves them in their position." [re£. 32] Thus, the prob-
ability of revolution increased with growing discontent, but




Figure 2. 1 Aristotle's Model of Revolution.
Over the centuries, this siapie model has proven
durable, although the concepts have at times acquired
different names ani slightly different meanings.
Maohiaveili, of course, aivised his prince to either repress
the people or acquire tiair approval. Modern sociology
explains political and sooiai order in terms of value and
coercion theories, ani Tad Gurr safs revolutionaries must
have "normative and utilitarian justification" in order to
use violence against the state {that is, they must believe
that it is both "right" ani "effective" to do so) [ref. 33].
Discontent is now commonly called relative deprivation, the
pivotal variable in psyci ological theories of political
violence to which we now turn.
23

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Modern psychological theories of political violence rest
upon the related concepts of relative deprivation, cognitive
dissonance, and frustration-aggression. 6 Relative depriva-
tion, or Aristotle's discontent, is usually an explicit
variable in psychological theories of violence and it is
often implicit in the modals of other disciplines.
According to the cognitive dissonance and frustration-
aggression concepts, an upsetting state of mini (e.g., from
relative deprivation) generates efforts to reduce the upset
or dissonance, often through aggression aimed at the
perceived cause cf the frustration. Therefore, deprived and
frustrated people may come to blame the government and
support an insurgent alternative. The argument is that
deprivation should be measured as an indicator of the poten-
tial for insurgency, but as we shall see, deprivation proves
to be a difficult and ambiguous indioator.
Individuals and groips may perceive themselves as
deprived on the basis of past experience cr through compar-
ison with some reference group. riey might perceive their
situation as worse than past experience led them to expect,
or they may observe othsr groups better off than they.
6 James Geschwen der* s "fourteen assumptions" in working
toward a general theory of social movements integrate much
of the material discussed a ere, incliding the theories of de
Tocqueviile, Marx, Sorokin, and Davies, and a capsule
summary of cognitive dissonance theory [ref. 34].
24

Relative deprivation is common in the developing countries,
as Crawford Young observes:
Neither mobility nor status is evenly distributed in a
society.- .[ thus] the relative wall-being of one group
serves as a reference point and aspiration level for
another. . .The enlargement of social horisons, intensifi-
cation of interactions through urbanization, widening
communications networks, and political competition have
Increased the number ani salience of reference groups.
Iref. 35]
1- Three „T„Y, pes , of _ "RD"
There are three types of relative deprivation (RD)
,
each inspiring a theory of political violence. Aspirational
deprivation occurs when expectations (what people believe
that they are capable of achieving) rise faster than satis-
factions (what people ictually achieve). Decremental
deprivation is when satisfactions decline while expectations
continue on as before. \nd a so-called third variant is a
combination of the first t*o.
With asp irat ional deprivation, an individual used to
regularly improving economic or status conditions may
suddenly find further progress blocked. His expectations
continue to rise while his satisfactions do not. This
happens to individuals in raste systems and other societies
where upward mobility is discontinuous at some point. It
inspires the theory that rebellion is most probable when
conditions in society are improving.
25

The classic expression of ispirational deprivation
is Alexis de Tocqueville 's account of the Fre'nch Revolution.
De Tocqueville asserted that people do not rebel when
hardest pressed, for then they are too busy just staying
alive. Rather, they do so once conditions begin to improve.
Such records of tha Ile-de-France Region as have
survived prove clearly that it was in the districts in
the vicinity of Paris that the old order was soones* and
most drastically superceded. . . . Well before 1789 the
system of forced labor (as appliei to individuals) had
disappeared in this region. The tiille (tax) had become
less onerous and was mora equitably assessed than
elsewhere.
Thus it was precisely in those parts of France where
there had been the most improvement that popular discon-
tent ran highest.... For it is not always when things
are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out.
Dn the countrary, it oftener happens that when a people
which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long
period without protest suddenly finds the government
relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it.
:ref. 36]
Douglas Bwy's quantitative research supports da
Tooqueville *s thesis. J sing "24 operational indices of
dcaestic conflict behavior occurring with 65 Latin American
provinces over a nine-year period," and testing the affects
of force, discontent, aid iegitinacy upon the dependent
variables of turmoil and internal war, Bwy shewed that
discontent was directly related to turmoil (dissatisfaction
and disorganized violence rising and falling together), but
inversely related to internal war (organized violence
becoming more likely as dissi tisfaction declined).
According to 3wy, "The positive regression coefficients
26

then, appear tc support the notion that •revolutions are
born in societies on the upswing.'" [ref. 37]
Karl Marx is the best known proponent of the theory
that decremental deprivation is ths cause of revolution.
Also called "downward mobility," this is an actual fall in
the level of satisfactions while expectations— conditioned
by previous experience--remain at the former, higher level.
A depression, the imposition of new taxes, famine--ali are
examples of decremental deprivation. According to this
reasoning, an uprising is likely when conditions in society
are worsening.
Marx argued that men ace apt to revolt when they are
most oppressed, increasingly impoverished, and lacking any
other hope for relief. " ref• 38] His well-known theory
begins by recognizing that although most factors of produc-
tion are relatively fixed in cost, wages can vary. Unable
to reduce fixed costs in order zo increase his profits, the
capitalist reduces what he pays for i = oor. Even if wages
are rising, the capitalist will increase his profits by
raising prices faster than he allows wages to rise. Thus,
ths worker's pay declines in purchasing power at the same
time as he sees the capitalists (a "reference group")
enjoying an improving standard of Living. As he becomes
poorer, the worker also finds his work becoming increasingly
monotonous as the result of industrialization. At some
point in his misery, the worker comes to understand his
plight, to acguire class consciousness, and to revolt.
27

Any disadvantaged group may experience a self-
awareness akin to Marx's -Lass consciousness. Thus, black
consciousness leads to militancy and violence in South
Africa, the United States, and elsewhere. Previously quies-
cent ethnic groups in developing countries assert themselves
when urbanization, improving communications, and expanding
literacy make them aware of their inferior standing relative
to others in society.
James Davies has attempted to reconcile de
Tocqueville and Marx by describing a third type of depriva-
tion. His "j-curve" theory hypothesizes satisfactions and
expectior.s both rising in synchronous parallel when suddenly
there is a real drop in satisfactions. A graph of the
satisfactions level thus resembles an inverted letter M J."
Revolutions are most likely to oocur when a prolonged
period of objective economic and social development is
followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-
important effect on the ninds of people in a particular
society is to produce, during tie former period, an
expectation of continued ability t3 satisfy needs--which
continue to rise--and, during the latter , a mental
state cf anxiety and frustration «rhen manifest reality
breaks away fr cm anticipated reality, the aotual state
of socioeconomic development is less significant than
the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and
aust continue in the futjre. [ref. 39]
Although Davies insists that his conoept applies
equally well to minor, unsuccessful rebellions and to major,
social revolutions, and that it accepts a variety of data on
economic, social, and political conditions, it fails as a









Figure 2.2 Davies 1 "J-Curve" Theory of Revolution.
there occur numerous downturns on the way to the "sharp
reversal." In a live situation, these could not be distin-
guished from the major event until after the fact. Davies'
graph of the period leading to the Russian Revolution shows
minor setbacks occurring with the assassination of the Czar
in 1881, the War with Japan in 190'4, a subsequent period of
repression in Russia, and the Jfar with Germany in 1914. An
analyst using the J-curve, then, might have produced a
series of false alarms over a 36-year period preceeding the
Russian Revolution. Seconily, there is no consistent length
to the periods of relative improvement and decline. There
would seem to be no way to employ this concept for accurate




2 . Ted Gurr 's Model
Ted Gurr's complex and quantifiable model of the
causes of political violence is based upon deprivation
theory and intended for practical application. [ref. 40]
The Central Intelligence Agency was sufficiently impressed
to test it. However, although the Agency determined that
the model was useful conceptually, it was incapable of
precise predictions.
The model can aid in profiling the underlying causes of
political violence. It can help the analyst focus in a
systematic way on the strengths and weaknesses of
specific actors [groups] with a potential for political
violence. It can aid in assessing conditions conducive
to particular forms of violence. And it can provide a
continuing quantitative measure which reflects and, in a
general way, predicts a major change in political
violence in a given country.... Yet, the methodological
#
oritique indicates serious deficiencies in the reli-
ability of the data generated by the model and in the
model's utility as a predictive tool, [ref. 41 ] 7
7 The Gurr model represents the "state of the art" in
complex, quantifiable models of political violence. The CIA
test made use of expert-generated, rather than empirical,
data. It called for analysts to evaluate specific factors
and respond in a manner that could be converted to numerical
values. The procedure was first appLied to an ex post facto
analysis of the pre-coup situation in Chile in mid-1973.
Obtaining encouraging results, it was tested in three
on-going situations of political oonf lict--in Argentina,
Ethiopia, and Thailand- -from late 1974 to mid-1975.
Nonetheless, it was judged that, "As to the model's
predictive capability, however, the results muse be regarded
at this stage as ambiguous and inconclusive." " ref . 42]
Among its identified shortcomings, the model puts heavy
demands en the analyst. Each panelist in the three "live
problem" tests made an average of 435 decisions with each
iteration. Also, the critique suggested taking into account
"unique factors" including the staDiiity of the political
system cf the country in guestion aid the traditional, or
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Figure 2.3 Ted Gurr»s Model of Political Violence [ ref . 44].
Although failing as a quantitative model, Gurr's
formula proves useful conceptually . It includes both
psychological and societal variables, the former repre-
senting individual mental processes while the latter
aggregate for all members of various social groups (e.g.,
special interest groups, the insurgents, the dominant elite).
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To use the modal, one first analyzes the target
population and distinguishes the political groups that are
relevant in a revolutionary situation. Then, for a hypo-
thetically "average" member of each group, one estimates tha
intensity of his relative deprivation (how angry is he?).
Multiplying that by the number of people in the group, and
summing for all such groups in the society, produces tha
potential for collective violence. This potential is polit-
icized to the degree that a r epresan tative individual can
justify, in normative and utilitarian terms, his use of
violence against the state. For example, violence may ba
normatively justified if the stata is perceived as respon-
sible for the deprivation and no nonviolent action is
possible to remedy the situation. Multiplying the potential
for collective violence by the portion of the society who
find violence justified, *e get the potential for political
violence. The intervening variables which translate this
into the magnitude of political violence are the balance of
insurgent and regime coeroive oontroi :ver the populace, and
the balance of institutional support which each enjoys. The
process is symplified by concentrating upon only those
groups where the deprivation is strongest and the means
exist for taking effective action.
The 3urr model offirs useful insights into political
violence and makes a complex problen manageable, but there
are at least three serious drawbacks to any model that
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explicitly recognizes deprivation as 2. variable. First is
the problem of how to measure it. Sscond is the uncertainty
of its correlation with political violence. And third is
tha fact that it is everywhere in the third world, thus
diluting its value as an indicator.
Relative deprivation exists In the minds of individ-
uals. It is subjective. A wealthy man may feel deprived
upon seeing a wealthier one. It is not solely economic, but
comprehends other values including social status and polit-
ical power. It does not exist only in the present, for it
concerns expectations of future achievement. How does one
find valid indicators for such a variable?
Gurr suggests determining taa "scope and intensity
of the psychological variables" through "survey techniques,"
but that is an impractical solution as Gurr himself recog-
nizes. "Political elites are notoriously sensitive about
inquiries into the disloyalties of their citizens...."
Instead, Gurr cffers very indirect indicators of depriva-
tion: "the total goods available for distribution in the
society, changes in each group's means for obtaining those
goods, and their changing levels of value attainment
vis-a-vis their own past and the experience of other
classes." [ref. 45]
Even if it could be observed and measursd, depriva-
tion's effect on political stability is unclear. De Tocque-
ville argued that revolts ire likely when such indicators of
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deprivation as tax rates, standards j£ living, and political
oppression are diminishing. Marx biiievad they become more
likely as deprivation increases. Da vies believed both were
right— at different times— while Bwy simply equivocates:
"While discontent, then, appears to be an important corre-
late of political instability, the direction of the
association is very much in doubt." [ref. 46] Moreover,
Edward Muller's test results showed no significant correla-
tion between the potential for political violence and
deprivation [ref. 47], and Mary lee nylor recently concluded
that "basic propositions, which fori the- common core of
widely-used past/present ralative deprivation formulations,
should be met with healthy skeptism.'1 [ref. 48]
Finally, there woald seem to be little value in a
variable that is nearly everywhere peasant in large measure.
Deprivation is most commonly represented in economic terms.
Speaking of such measures and tha frameworks in which they
are employed, one authority conclude!,
The difficulty with the economic: theories of political
violence is that they provide as with an "all systems
go" perspective, and we wonder why societies do net
trigger continual turmoil. ... Economic frustration dees
not always produce political violence, and it is essen-
tial to understand the powerful effects that




C. "BALANCES" OF ORGANIZATION, LEGITIMACY, AND COERCION
For good reasons we reject trying to estimate the poten-
tial for insurgency by measuring ths level of discontent in
a society. More productive and practical is to focus upon
Aristotle's intervening variables of legitimacy and coer-
cion, along with an important addition.: organization. In
effect, discontent is absorbed into legitimacy, for discon-
tent can be a stimulus to rebellion only if it is blamed
upon the government. When a people find their leaders to be
responsible for their problems, or ineffective in reducing
their grievances, they regard that rsgime as illegitimate.
It is essential to add organization as a variable
because insurgency requires mobilizing large numbers of
people on both sides. A recant stady of insurgency notes
that "political organization is what distinguishes insurgent
movements from banditry and Robin H:>odism" [ref. 50], and
Robert Thompson (the weil-known British authority) advises
that "the key thing in any counter-insurgency is or^aniza-
tion. ..
.
The priority still remains tc break [the
insurgents'] infrastructure." [ref. 51]
In sum, the framework presented here adopts many of the
concepts and technigues provided by Aristotle, Gurr, and
others. In selecting and combining, it also aciifies them.
It adopts Aristotle's intervening /ariables of legitimacy
and coercion, finding them critical to the outcome of any
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insurgency. It adds organization as a third primary vari-
able, believing organization to be a precondition for
acquiring legitimacy and coercive oapabilities. But it
avoids the difficulties of trying to use discontent as an
explicit variable.
The framework considers organization, legitimacy, and
coercion as three "balances" between the government and the
insurgents. Adopting Sure 's technique of making a complex
problem manageable by dividing it iito simpler increments,
these to be recombined later, the three balances are divided
into twenty-eight analytical factors. Section III now pres-







Among the greatest enemies of th.3 next revolution are
the academic theorists who vcite about the last one....
Lessons which are too naat and principles which are too
vague are generalized.... "Modals" of revolution are
produced. Thus we have a Leninist, a Maoist and a
Suevarist model whose contemporary Western adherents
indulge in abstruse and often irrelevant arguments.
;ref. 52]
Section III provides an overview of the twenty-eight
analytical factors and four insurgent phases that make up
the framework.. There ara three sats of factors to describe
the situation (i.e., the society and the physical environ-
ment) , the government, and the insurgants. Within the sets,
each factor is "typed" to show whathar it primarily relates
to the government- insurga nt "balance" of organization,
legitimacy, or coercion. k movement that develops fully and
culminates in an insurgant victory is dividad into four
successive phases: the pariod befsra an insurgent movement
emerges, the nonviolent stage, the armed struggle, and tha
period of consolidation of the new cagime. Section 71 will
group the factors into a separata worksheet foe each insur-
gent phase. The illustrations in Section VI show how the




A. A CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE
Figure 3.1 depicts how the variables organization,
legitimacy, and coercion relate to each other. It also
shows the secondary variables they oomprise. The letter-
number symbols represent the analytical factors and show
where each fits in the conceptual framework. The symbols
will net be intelligible at this point, but the reader may
find it useful to refer to Figure 3. 1 later. Although the
schematic is simplified to show each factor only once, there
is considerable interaction and overlap among the factors.
All of them are considered in due course— ani ultimately
conbined into an overall evaluation of the struggle— so that.
repeating them wculd serve only to complicate and confuse.
The diagram shows organization to be the key ingredient
in any insurgent situation. Organization provides the means
for acquiring legitimacy and cosreion. It consists of
leadership, structure, discipline, and ideology.
Leadership provides essential skills, and organizational
structure adds the numerical strength of followers. The
leaders motivate members by interpreting anl explaining
issues and events. They plan policies and lead in carrying
them out. The structure links the Leaders with the members
ani mobilizes human ani aaterial resources. It transmits
directives downward and channels grievances upward.
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Organization: The basis of legitime oy and coercion
Leadership: Provides skills (agitates, j
organizes, leads) — 13-1 |
I
Structure: Provides strength (mobilizesl
resources) — S-1 , S-2, S-3, S-4, IG-2|
| Discipline: Controls followers — IG-3j
I I
j Ideology: Diff 3 rentiatss I Unifies: ->— >—
>
| Controls leaders | |
I
-LEGITIMACY: The right to rule I
r i
Identification: Normative support <--<•
— IG-4 |
I
Effectiveness: Utilitarian support |
— S-5, 5-6, IG-5 |
-COERCION: The power to rule
| Resources: Capabilities





I Strategy > Tactics: Methods
| — IG-6, IG-9
j
Figure 3.1 k Conceptual Outline,
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Discipline contributes to success by controling members
ana enforcing directives. In particular, defections—clear
breeches of discipline— deplete organizational strength and
provide the other side with intelligence, weapoas, and other
resources.
Ideology differentiates believers from nonbelie vers; it
defines shared values that strengthen a group internally.
Ideology fosters commitment and is principally responsible
for motivating ana controlling top-ranking and mid- level
leaders. Our framework includes ideology within legitimacy,
whare it becomes a determinant of identification with either
the regime or the rebels.
Legitimacy and coercion complement each other.
Legitimacy, or the perception that the leaders are worthy of
support, reduces the need for coercion. Legitimacy results
when people identify with the leadership and when they
perceive that the leaders are effective in accomplishing
tasks.
Coercion is both the threat and the use of force to gain
compliance. When legitimacy is low, leaders rely upon coer-
cion. The available coercive resources constitute a
potential which is mediatad by environmental constraints.




The twenty-eight analytical factors are indicators of
the concepts shown. Ten relate to the situation (S) , and
nine each describe the government (G) and the insurgents
(I) . The "G" and "I" factors are mirror-imaged and later
combined, thus they are shown as "IG.
"
Some of the indicators are familiar and straightforward,
while others are little known or complex. Each calls for a
single judgement to be recorded on the scale provided, but
that is only part of what is intended. The framework is a
structured learning process that hopefully will unearth
considerations that a less disciplined approach might miss.
At the conclusion of stai y, there should be a broad and
in-depth understanding of the situation. Whether or not the
analyst finds Section VI' s graphic worksheets to be useful,
he hopefully will profit from the check-list approach to the
problem.
B. FACTOR OVERVIEW
1 • Situational Factors
The Situational Factors (see Figure 3.2) describe
the society and the physical environment; they examine the
predisposing conditions to an insurgency amd are valid for
analysis whether or not an insurgent group has appeared.
Some apply to the country as a whol = and help to identify
states where an insurgency is likely to emerge or flourish.
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Others describe characteristics of social groups or regions
within a country. Taken together, they reveal cross-cutting
and reinforcing patterns af varying strength. For example,
whan geoethnic divisions ara reinforced by grievances
resulting from differential modernization, terrain favorabla
to guerrilla warfare, and good proximity and access to
external support and sanctuary, not only is tha probability
of insurgency high, but the shapa of the conflict can ba
discerned.
The scales accompanying tha factors have several
properties.
1. First, they avoid forcing unrealistic, all-or-nothing
decisions and allow the analyst to register a
response anywhere batwean two stated coniitions.
2. Second, the endpoiits are two polarized types of tha
variable under consideration, the range between them
being most relevant to the insurgent situation. Some
scales add intermediate benchiarks as further aids.
3. Third, there are no arbitrary thresholds above or
below which it night be asserted that insurgency is
likely or not.
U. And fourth, the scales are isomorphic, with condi-
tions favoring the government or suggesting stability
toward the left end, and those favoring the insur-
gents or signalling instability toward the right. In
most cases, the scales indicate relative advantage
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between the twc sides. In a few cases, however, the
dimension examined suggests the probability of
stability—instability working to the government's
disadvantage and favoring the insurgents. The
pattern of responses visually suggests the prob-
ability that an insurgency will appear or the overall
advantage in an on-going struggle.
Factors S-1 and 5-2 examine societal cleavages of
race, ethnicity, language, religion, geography, lineage,
class, caste, and more in order to determine the major
social groups within a population and the barriers to organ-
ization. Cultural pluraLism refers to vertical cleavages
that differentiate communities, while the mass-elite gap
tests a horizontal division (discrimination) . Certain
patterns are politically I estabilizlng, and tie groups so
defined are the potential actors in an insurgency.
S-3 and S-4 relate to the potential for mobilizing
the population to support an insurgent group. Existing
urban-rural ties tend to Lessen the time and effort required
to forge a revolutionary coalition between the potential
leaders in the towns and the mass fDilowers in the country-
side. Relatively autonomous peasants are unlikely to assume
great risks and join the insurgents.
S-5 and S-6 investigate two aajor causes of discon-
tent that historically have stimulated rebellions,
revolutions, and civil wars. The level of landlessness is
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Toward the Left favors the Govsrnnent ; Toward the
Right favors the Insurgents.
b—
rq an iz at io n al F act o r
s
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.
or many 2 or 3
I
! 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.
same % as in population 0%
j -| 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.
minimal/cont rolled ext snsive/ur.controlled
j 1 2 3-— 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.
exit option vulnerable
j
-, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
|
Legitimacy Factors
FACTOR S-5. Landiessna ss.
20% 30% 40% 60%
1
, -j 2 3 j 4 | 6 | 7 8 9 l
FACTOR S-6. Differential .Modernization.
eguitable highly polarizing
| 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
-H
Coercion, Factors
FACTOR S-7. Traditional Lavel of Violence.
low high
j -j 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR S-8. arms & Military Skills.
scarce abundant
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.
impenetrable /hone porous/plentiful
I
1 2 3 4 5 5 " e 9 |
FACTOR S-10. Terrain S Lines of Communications,
open/good rough/poor
Figure 3.2 Situational Factors.
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ens indicator of peasant restiveness; it suggests the prob-
able impact of insurgent promises of "land to the tiller."
The polarizing effects of modernization tend to produce
disgruntled "have-nots" anxious to force a redistribution of
society's goods.
S-7 recognizes that people vary in their inclination
to use violence. It examines history as a guide to this
important variable.
S-3 calculates the military skills and arms avail-
able within the country. Although guns alone do not shoot
people, they are essential nonetheless. Even if the govern-
ment controls the skills bank and arsenal, defections and
raids can effect the transfers.
S-9 and S-10 examine the country's external isola-
tion and internal accessabi lity and concealment. These are
geographical determinants of insurgent supply and survival.
2. Government and, Insu rgent Factors
Whereas the Situational Factors describe predis-
posing conditions in the social and environmental "arena,"
the Government (Figure 3.3) and Insurgent Factors (Figure
3.4) consider more immediate causes involving the "actors"
in an insurgency. There are two mi rr or- imaged sets of nine
factors each. When combined on dual scales, each pair of
factors indicates a common dimension but uses different
benchmarks for the government ind the insurgents.
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Toward the Left favors the Government ; Toward the
Right favors the Insurgents.
Organizational Factors
FACTOR G-1. Concentration of authority.
unitary diffused
j -, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 |
FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.
open blocked
,
-j 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR G-3. Loyalty.
intact defections
| 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
Legitimacy Factors
FACTOR G-4. Origin S Indigenous Authority.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
, 1( 2--I-3 | 5|— 5--I-7 8 |— 9 |
FACTOR G-5. Rural Services.
effective ineffective




FACTOR G-7. Armed Focoes > Police.
strong weak
| 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR G-8. External lid.
unneeded plenty some none
,
-j 2 | —3 4 5 5 7 1 8 9 |
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.
legal/aoprop riate illegal/excessive




Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the
Right favors the insurgents.
H
Organizational Fact 2 r
s
FACTOR 1-1. Unity of Command.
hostile rivals cooperative unitary
,
-j 2- |— 3 4 5 5 7- |— 8 9 |





FACTOR 1-4. Ideology 5 Appeal.
fragile strong
FACTOR 1-5. Administration in Rabel Areas,
ineffective effective
Coercion Factors




FACTOR 1-8. External lid.
none some plenty an needed
I
-, 2| 3 4 5 6 7 I 8 9 |
FACTOR 1-9. Tactics.
nonviolent paramilitary
Figure 3.4 Insurgent Factors,
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Factors G-1 and 1-1 are measures of the centraliza-
tion of decision-making ii the government and the insurgent
organization. They ceflact the principle of "unity of
conmand" and an appreciation of ths speed, efficiency, and
constancy inherent in unified authority.
G-2 and 1-2 gaige an important inducement to
recruitment. The opportunities for upward mobility (a
product of the scope of ths organizational structure and the
criteria for participation) , are particularly important in
ths contest for popular support.
G-3 and 1-3 examine defections as an indication of
discipline (as well as loyalty and noraie) within the two
camps.
G-4 and 1-4 regard the degree to which people iden-
tify with an organization as a measure of its legitimacy.
Governmental institutions that ar = well based in local
tradition, along with borders of historical or self-
determined origin, augur well for regime legitimacy. an
insurgent program that is respectful of local traditions and
associated with a prestigious ideology is an attraction to
potential supporters and a strengthening bond among members.
G-5 and 1-5 consider each side's effectiveness in
meeting the responsibilities of government. The legitimate
leaders are those who accomplish ths tasks that the people
consider important and appropriate.
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G-6 and 1-6 are estimates of the control each side
exercises over the population and territory under its
authority. Totalitarian control is the standard by which
government coercion is judged. For the insurgents, the
existence of liberated areas from which they cannot be
evicted is a telling indicator of control over a segment of
the population.
G-7 and 1-7 are estimates of government and insur-
gent armed strength. Taken separately, they are less
meaningful than when combiaed into a ratio. The direction
and rate of change in the ratio is more significant than its
absolute level.
G-8 and 1-8 are estimates Df the external support
available to each side. The "taint" of foreign association,
and the patron 1 s constraints on one's actions, are among the
caveates here.
G-9 and 1-9 evaluate the use of violence by each
side. The government would be wise to observe its own laws
and avoid excessive viols nee so as not to diminish its
legitimacy. For the insirgents, wiose use of violence is
illegal in any case, it is more appropriate to examine the
scope of operations. Paramilitary organization and tactics
imply the capability to field foross able effectively to
challenge those of the government.
4?

C. FOUR PHASES OF INSURGENCY
The analytical factors are indicators of the causes of
insurgency, but we also need to be familiar with how the
process unfolds. Scholars offer any number of process
models, but a formula of four clearly demarcated phases
seams best. Before preseating that model, we briefly review
several others.
Crane Brinton is probably the best known of the histo-
rians who compared the Great Revolutions in England,
America, France, and Rassia in search of patterns. His
"striking uniformities," analogy of revolution to a fever,
and various stages of the process are widely known. [ref.
53]
Brinton generally supported de rocqueviile ' s findings
that the societies studied were economically advancing at
the time of the revolution. Like Aristotle, Brinton noted
that those who were increasingly well off economically
complained of their lack of commensurate political leverage.
One significant observation was that the society's intellec-
tuals were switching their allegiance from the regime to the
dissidents, while another was that the old regime was in
each case inefficient and the ruling class inept. The inef-
ficiency resulted from governmental institutions that did
not adjust to changing circumstances, such as industrializa-
tion and modernization generally. Individuals were growing
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distrustful and detached, and were sometimes defecting. The
governments proved particularly inapt at coping with finan-
cial crises brought on by war or modernization, and they
mishandled the armed focces. Brinton found the government's
military ineptitude was more responsible for defeat than was
any rebel prowess.
It is almost safe to say that no government is likely to
be overthrown from within its territory until it loses
the ability tc make adequate use of its military and
police powers, [ref. 54
]
Brinton's stages of revolution were later elaborated by
David Schwartz to describe "a mass-linked social movement
oriented to the acquisition of political power through the
use of social disruption and/or violence—including insur-
gencies, civil wars, and nationalist movements, but
excluding most ccups." [ref. 55] Et sounds appropriate to
our needs.
There are ten stages to the Brinton/Schwartz model of
revolution.
1. The political alienation phass. Individuals begin to
withdraw their support from -he regime. Violent
crimes are on the rise, as are instances of personal
disorders (such as, vice, insanity, suicide) and
political withdrawal (such as falling voter
turnouts)
.
2. The origin of revolutionary organizations. New revo-
lutionary groups appear, existing reformist
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organizations become increasingly radical, and
intellectuals criticize the government. These organ-
izations pattern themselves after previous
revolutionary examples or governmental institutions,
although the result is also saaped by their "resource
mix" of participation, money, weapons, discipline,
and so forth.
3. The revolutionary organizations make appeals for
support. They reveal their targets and techniques,
and they propose solutions to the state's problems
that cannot be met without the regime virtually
abdicatin g.
4. The revolutionary coalition and movement building
stage. The government ani the dissidents are
increasingly polarized, ind the revolutionary
leadership expands.
5. The period of nonviolent revolutionary politics.
Here Schwartz believes that "any spark can touch off
the revolution."
6. The outbreak of revolutionary violence. The govern-
ment tries to respond with force, fails, and the
revolutionaries talce over.
7. The rule of the moierates. This is the brief calm
that Brinton calls the "honeymoon." Moderate revolu-
tionary leaders tafce over, bat they are ao match for
the extremists pressing them.
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8. The accession of the extremists. Dae to "their
discipline, their contempt for half measures, their
willingness to make firm decisions, their freedom
from libertarian qualms," thsse men are better able
to centralize power and rule affectively. Power thus
shifts from the "right" to the "left" until "it
reaches a limit usually short of the most extreme or
lunatic Left.
"
9. The reign of terrDr . The asw government arrogates
great power to itself. It creates emergency councils
or commissions often dominated by a "strong man,"
sets up extraordinary courts and revolutionary
police, and denies civil liberties. The measures are
excessive, even for crisis circumstances. There is
profligate use of tie swcrd, guillotine, or rifle.
10. Thermidor. The terror subsides, although short
relapses are possible. The revolution is over.
However, if the Brinton/Schwartz model appears useful,
we must heed the complaint by John Lewis that "theorists of
revolution have grown too dependent on frameworks developed
largely from the evidence of Western revolutions." [ref.
56] The model we use muse, reflect third-world realities and
avoid the- mirror-imaging of European patterns.
Samuel Huntington and Zharies Tilly draw several
contrasts between the circumstances and patterns of revolu-
tions in Europe and Asia. Tilly points to "the combination
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of weak patronage, weak corporate fciaship, relatively homo-
geneous culture, and territorial comnanities that were prom-
inent as units of solidarity and collective action [in]
Europe," conditions generally not found in Asia [ ref . 57].
Huntington, meanwhile, captures the difference in patterns.
In the Western revolution the revolutionaries come to
power in the capital first and then gradually expand
their control over the countryside. In the Eastern
revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of
the country, establish a base area of control in a
remote section, struggle to win the support of the peas-
ants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the
scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the
level of their military operations from individual
terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile
warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able
to defeat the government troops in battle. The last
phase of the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of
the capital. [ref. 58]
Our framework must be designed to analyze movements of
the Eastern "per iphery-^in" pattern, rather than those of the
Western "center- cut" variaty. More appropriate models come
from the study of Asian movements beginning with the Chinese
Communist Revolution. For example, Robert Scalapino sees
five, self-explanatory stages to a communist, rural revolu-
tion: "party emergence, broadening the base of the party,
mounting the challenge to the ruling party (class), the
people's war, and the establishment of People's Democracy."
[raf. 59] To this, we could add Mao Zedong's three stages of
people's war: strategic iafense, stalemate, and strategic
offense [ref. 60]. Another model stresses modas of warfare
and arrives at the five steps of the establishment of a
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vanguard, survival, protracted warfare, mobile warfare, and
positional warfare [ref. 51].
There are other possible models, but each has its draw-
backs. Many feature prominently developments that are
peculiar to only one or a few historical cases. Thus, some
schemes focus on the need for a strong party and the value
of a united front to harness and control other revolutionary
individuals and groups. Although this was the pattern in
China and Vietnam, it was not in Cuba. Some models are
designed from those movenents that co-opted traditional
leadership and structures, at least initially, but groups
have also established entirely new organizations. A charac-
teristic of many models is the Lack of sharp contrast
between phases. As one stage blurs into the next, the model
loses much of its predictive and explanatory power.
The model adopted separates four phases of an insurgency
by three sharp thresholds unlikely to be missed by an atten-
tive observer. The thresholds are the emergence of an
insurgent movement and ths beginning and end of the armed
struggle. Figure 3.5 shows how various process models
correlate to this one. It also suggests the different
analytical tasks associate! with eaoh phase. These deter-
mine the selection of analytical factors for each worksheet.
Section VI groups the appropriate factors into three
worksheets corresponding to the first three phases of this




| 1. PRE-EMERGENT STAGE:
| This is the Brinton/Schwartz pha 3a of intial |
{political alienation. This stage i s one of evaluating |
Iconditions and dissident groups for the potential to |
| develop into a viable challenge to tha government. |
j The analyst gauges tha potential for insurgency > |
land predicts the appearance of a movement. I
j Threshold: A££earance of an i asurgent movement. I
•
|2. ORGANIZATION AND GROWTH STAGE:
i
| The Brinton/Schwartz phases of t aa origin of the |
| re volutionary organization , rsvoliit ionary appeals, |
Revolutionary coalition and moveman t building, and |
Inonviolent revolutionary politics. Scalapino's model |
| lists the phases of party emergence , broadening base, |
land mounting a challenge.
| The analyst monitors tie group*
s
axpansion and |
| predicts the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. |




|3. ARMED STRUGGLE - including tha sub-stages of |
Iguerrilla warfare (when the insurga its are weak and |
I
harassing) and conventional warfare (a time of rough |
Iparity, civil war):
| The Brinton/Schwartz outbreak of revolutionary |
| violence phase. Scalipino's stage of people's war. |
Ittao's strategic defensa, stalemate, and strategic |
|of fense.




Threshold: "End" of ho utilities. |
I
(Insurgent defeat may meai a return to stage 2, whereas |
I victory brings on stags u. )
|4. CONSOLIDATION:
I The Brinton/Schwartz phases of rala of the modsratas.
(accession of the extremists, reigns of terror, and |
Ithermidor. Scalipino's astablishma n t of peopla * s |
Idamocracy. Other models prescribe victory and |
| consolidation.
I The analyst forecasts the natura of the ultimate |
| regime.
J
Figure 3.5 Procass Sodel of Insurgency.
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If we are to understand the phenomenon of revolution, we
lust take into account the entire society that produces
it and not isolate a factor
—
poLitical, social, or
economic--as if it alone were the ultimate and deter-
mining one. We must look at all of them together and in
relation to one another in order to see the true condi-
tions under which revolt and revolution have been
possible and fomented. [ ref. 62]
The length, detail, and order of presentation here are
not intended to reflect the relativs significance of indi-
vidual factors. The sections vary according to how familiar
and simple each item is, and the ordar is arbitrary.
A. THE SOCIETY
1 • Societal Cleavages
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.
or many 2 or 3
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.
same % as in population 0%
Societal patterns of two or three major groups are
the least stable. A mass-elite gap indicating discrimina-
tion against a group suggests a potentially receptive
audience for insurgent appeals.
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All societies are divided ta some extent, and the
pattern and intensity of the splits have clear implications
for insurgent situations. Vertical cleavages separate
"communities" according to such ascriptive criteria as race,
ethnicity, language, religion, geography, ideology, or
clientelism. Horizontal oleavages form strata, typically
socioeconomic classes or castes. Together, these divisions
constitute a grid upon society. The cleavages are barriers
to organization —frequently "encapsulating" an insurgent
movement and preventing its expansion--and the groups or
"social forces" they differentiate are potential actors in
an insurgency.
He examining social cleavages in order to gauge the
potential for the government and tie insurgents to expand
their organizations and popular base. The differences
between groups indicate their ability to cooperate, as in an
insurgent movement. Most important are the patterns which
reinforce each other to craate espaciaily strong barriers.
1. The vertical and horizontal divisions can be cross-
cutting - working to divide aid weaken - or they may
be reinforcing. For example, socioeconomic class
bends tend to break down ethnic differences over
time. 3ecause classes generally are weak in the
third world, ethnicity frequently demands primary
allegiance. Should a black aiddle class develop in
South Africa, forging economic ties to the white
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middle class, it would weaken black solidarity. For
the present, however, race and class reinforce each
other there to form an especially stroag separation
between the white elite and the black majority.
2. The intensity of individual cleavages varies. In the
United States, religious differences are far less
divisive than in the Middle East.
3. The groups formed by these pitterns vary in size and
in the resources they control. In Malaysia, the
Malays have most of the political power, while the
Chinese and Indians possess the greater share of the
wealth. Of the latter, the Chinese greatly outnumber
the Indians.
4. The grid upon any society slowly changes, individuals
and groups realigning as different issues arise.
Ted Gurr finds than "multiracial societies [so
common in the third world] tend to have greater levels of
strife of ail ki r.ds. .
.[ and ] countries with ethnic diversity
also are more likely to have regional and political diversi-
ties, which also tend to generate internal conflicts."
[ref. 63] Samuel Huntington finds that "hierarchical [i.e.,
vertical] ethnic structures exhibit the paradox of normative
support for inequality for long periods of time and then
large-scale, bloody social re volutions when the system's
normative bases are eroded." [ref. 64] Gurr thus expects
frequent violence in the third world, while Huntington warns
that it will be traumatic.
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Factor S -1 examines vertical cleavages with the aid
of Crawford Young's six- fold classificatory system of
culturally plural societies and his empirical finding that
conflicts are most apt to get out of control when there are
two or three primary groups, young's classifications are:
1. A. Homogeneous.
2. B. A sinale clearlf dominant group, with minorities.
3. C. Core culture, linked to central institutions,
with differentiated groups in the periphery.
4. D. Dominant bipolar pattern.
5. E. Multipolar pattern, with 20 dominant groups.
6. F. Multiplicity of cultures, with more than one
basis of differentiation. !r = f. 65]
.
The relationship between instability aid the number
of major groups in a society is curvilinear. Instability
tends to be low in societies of one primary culture (e.g.,
Botswana, Somalia, Thailand, and 7ietnam), rises to its
highest levels in countries of two 3r three cultural groups
(e.g., Burundi, Nigeria, Malaysia), and drops again in
states of many cultures (e.g., India, Tanzania, Indonesia,
and the Philippines).
Mostly homogeneous Botswana, Somalia, and Thailand
are relatively stable countries. In India, with its extreme
diversity, Young accounts for the apparent stability:
Religion, caste, and language provide interlocking,
interacting, but distinctively separate bases for polit-
ically relevant groups.... [and] cross-cutting




In contrast, one easily recalls the destructive civil wars
and "emergency" in Burundi, Nigeria, aid Malaysia.
Nigeria's proliferation of internal states (now 19) is
intended to achieve stability by fragmenting the three major
ethnic groups and reducing the resources under their
control. Similarly, South Africa's policy af creating
numerous black "homelands" is a strategy designed to break
down racial and class solidarity by accenting "tribal"
differences.
Vietnam and the Philippines at first glance appear
to challenge Young's hypothesis— although certainly excep-
tions must be expected. But despite Vietnam's single core
culture, the resistance against the French, Japanese, and
Americans was clearly between two separate communities:
natives and foreigners. Moreover, the artificial separation
of the country at the 17th parallel broke the core culture
into two rival groups. la the Philippines, insurgency has
waxed and waned for years in areas of dense population on
the islands of Luzon and the ifisayas, but despite an abun-
dance of economic grievances, ethnic diversity, geography,
and other features have tended to "culturally encapsulate"
the movement in these areas. The Muslim situation in the
south is typical of the separatist demands of small, periph-
eral groups in the third world. (Section VI examines the
Philippines as an illustration of the methodology.)
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The scale accompanying Factor G- 1 places the least
stable condition of "2 or 3" major cultures at the right-
hand end, and "1 or many" at the left-hand, stable end. At
least two "actors" are necessary for there to be a conflict,
and the existence of itany actors leads to a stable
balancing.
Factor S -2 is an indication of horizontal cleavage.
The existence of a jass-eli te^gap, (calculated separately for
each relevant group in the society! indicates discrimination
impairing the upward mobility of group members. [ref. 67]
Any group's representation among the society's elites may be
greater, equal to, or less than its proportion of the total
population. If group members enjcy representation among the
elites that is mere than or equal to their percentage of the
population, then the group is eithar priviledged or "justly"
represented. But the existence of a mass-elite gap indi-
cates that the group is relatively deprived. The greater
the gap, the mere that a group is iiscriminated against.
This tends to breed group dt class consciousness and growing
res entment.
Should the available data not permit calculating the
percentages called for by the mass-elite gap, Ted Gurr's
scoring system for economic discrimination may prove useful.
Defining economic discrimination as the "systematic exclu-
sion of social groups from higher economic value positions
on ascriptive bases," 3urr's four inscriptions of steadily
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increasing discrimination could be evenly spaced along the
factor scale from left to right (i.e., beginning with the
greatest discrimination at the right-hand pole).
1. Most higher econoaic value positions, or some
specific classes of economic activity, are closed to
the group.
2. Most higher and some medium economic value positions
are closed, or nany specific classes of economic
activity [are closed ].
3. Most higher and Bost medium economic value positions
are closed.
4. almost all higher, medium, and some lower economic
value positions are closed. [ ref • 68]
For Factors S-1 ani S-2, the more that a society is
integrated, the less likely insurgency becomes [ref. 69].
However, measures taken to integrate a society vertically
(i.e., reordering representation of social groups within the
elite tc close a mass-elite gap) may aggravate communal
tensions. Speaking of African regimes, Donald Morrison
argues,
Those means of closing the mass-elite gap which succeed
in reducing the incidence of elite instability increase
the likelihood of communal instability, and those means
which succeed in reducing the incidence of communal
instability increase the likelihDod of elite insta-
bility ... .The problem is one of satisfying the demands
of ethnic groups for egual access to the rewards of
modernization and elite status, while at the same time
preventing an intensification of conflict over the
scarce positions of power and wealth among members of an





FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction,
minimal/controlled extensive/uncontrolled
j
-1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
1
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.
exit option vulnerable
,
<| 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
I
Extensive, uncontrolled urban-rural ties and eroded
peasant autonomy facilitate insurgent organization.
Third-world insurgencies, like their earlier
European counterparts, tend to begin in the cities, but
because the government's coercive capabilities are concen-
trated there, urban movements frequently fail. Students of
Asian revolutions thus speak Df the elite mobilization and
mass mobilization, or the urban ind rural, phases of a
revolution.
Unless they succeed with a ccup d'etat, the cdds are
against the urban rebels. In most underdeveloped countries,
the urban proletariat is extrsmely smaLl and the
Marxist-Leninist model of urban revolt unworkable. Thus,
the Chinese communists were slaughtered in Shanghai and
other major cities in 1927. They were forced to turn
instead to a peasant movement. Vietnamese resistance began
in the cities, as did Castro's original group, but they had
to move to the countryside to succeed.
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A rural insurgent movement aust combine urban lead-
ership 8 with rural recruits, prinarily peasants. Two
important considerations in gauging the potential for an
insurgent movement to appear and prosper are the existing
relations between urban and rural arsas and the traditional
passivity of the peasant. Existing lrban-rural links gener-
ally facilitate the formation of a "revolutionary coalition"
of town and countryside. They will lave begun to break down
the peasants traditional suspicion of "outsiders" from
beyond the village. To the degree that links beyond the
village make the peasant more approachable, they also tend
to exploit him, giving him cause to rebel.
8 Whether or not the movement has an initial period of
urban insurrection, the insurgent leaders tend not to come
from the peasants or workers, but from the more urbanized
intellectuals, students, professionals, and other socioeco-
nomically advantaged menoers of society. For example,
according to a ccmmunist document, some sixty percent of the
leadership of the Malayan iprising came to the party by way
of the student movement [ref. 7 1], and the top leaders of
the Huk movement in the Philippines were "urban intellec-
tuals, bureaucrats, lawyers, and other professionals" [ref.
72]. A study by the Vietnamese Zonmunist Party once founi
that 7U% of its 1855 leading oadres at the time were intel-
lectuals or of bourgeoise origin "ref. 73]. Lenin was a
lawyer, the grandson of a physician and son of a school
distric* administrator. So Chi Mini's father was a gentry
official, and Vo Nguyen Giap held a ioctorate of law degree.
Castro was a lawyer and the son of a wealthy plantation




Factor S^3 evaluates the urban-rural interaction;.
Initially, a major insurgency is less likely if the ties
between the urban and rural areas ace weak. Later, it is
also true that a government improves its chances if it can
control this interaction, making it a barrier between the
guerrillas and their urban sources of recruits, supplies,
and intelligence.
Charles Tilly has extensively researched the subject
of "town and country in revolution." Tilly writes,
To the extent that the prevailing rural-urban division
separates exploited agricultural workers from their
exploiters, it tells us, we should expect little collab-
oration between rural and urban classes and little
common action from the necessarily fragmented country-
side, despite the prcbaoiiity of widespread conflict on
a local scale. A revolutionary novement is likely to
bring town and country together only where the town is
already serving as a generator of rural activity. And
in a predominantly agricultural country the revolution
is likely to fail if an effective rural-urban coalition
of the exploited classes does not appear.
If rural-urban cleavage is great, a successful revolu-
tion is less likely; ths cleavage separates the natural
revolutionaries, the exploited classes of town and
country, from each other.
All other things being egual, the more thoroughly the
influence of cities pervades the countryside, the more
likely is revolution. Revolution, in this case, is the
effective transfer of pswer to a n=w class. Rebellions
of different sorts are guite likely to occur where the
working classes of city and country are insulated from
each other. But an effective transfer of power requires
a union of the two. * ref . 75]
Urbanization and economic development establish ties
between the two areas, and in most parts of Asia a single
local elite controls the major links from any particular
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rural area to the central government. Usually, this is the
landowners, and Tilly finis that if they are in place (i.e.,
not absent in the cites) and loyal to the government, no
widespread mobilization of the countryside can succeed
without their co llaborat ion . Thus, under certain circum-
stances, the government can control the urban-rural linkage.
During the unsuccessful Malayan insurgency in the
1950's, the government used population and movement
controls, resettlement, and other techniques to isolate the
rural guerrillas from their urban supporters. Since the
insurgents lacked external sources of supply, the Chinese
squatters located near the towns and villages were virtually
their only popular base of support. Sir Robert Thompson
stresses how critical it was to break those ties:
Unless the communist subversive political organization
in the towns and villages is broken and eliminated, the
insurgent guerilla units will not be defeated.
In the process of eliminating the political organ-
ization, the attention of the intelligence organization
should also be directed to identifying, and eliminating
if possible, ail members of the insurgent organization
who for one reason or another have to cross this heavy
Line [drawn on a chart] between tie insurgent units and
the population. This should be followed up by civilian
measures and military operations iesigned to break the
contact between the guerilla units and the subversive
political organization. As this process develops, the
guerilla units will theiiseives be forced to cross + he
line in an attempt to make contact with, and support,
their political organization and to secure their sources
of supply. The area of the heavy line is turned into a




Isolation of the insurgents from the people ensures
rebel defeat. Under conditions of aany third-world areas,
cutting the guerrillas off from the more heavily populated
areas will be effective. This is ^specially true if rural
recruits and external soirees of supply are quite limited,
and it becomes possible if urban-rural ties are minimal or
government-controlled. Where such ties are extensive, they
will likely be beyond ths governmsnt's limited capacity to
control.
Factor_S^4 is an indicator of the relative diffi-
culty an insurgent movemsnt must encounter in trying to
mobilize £easant support. Their participation appears
essential to insurgent success. Isd 3urr calculates that
peasants and farmers participated in 93 percent of the
internal wars in 114 nations and colonies between 1961 and
1965.9
Yet, anthropologists agres that the peasant, is
traditionally passive, suspicious of outsiders, and
unwilling to risk all in a revolt. Eric Wolf finds this
understandable. Usually, the peasant is isolated, much
concerned with survival, and able to retreat to subsistence
farming when threatened. He is somewhat insulated from
9 Gurr defines internal wars as instances of "highly
organized strife with widespread popular participation,
accompanied by extensive violence and including large-scale
terrorism and guerrilla *ars; civil wars; 'private' wars
among ethnic, political, and rsligious groups; and
large-scale revolts." [ref. 77]
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economic shock by kinship support and supplemental income
from handicraft production. Ha has little power unless
aided, and the impotent do not rebal. [ref. 78]
Joel Higdal sees three essential preconditions to
mobilizing the peasants. First, the village lust partici-
pate in the cash market. Second, market participation must
have exposed the villagers to corruption, monopoly, and
structural incompleteness (blocked upward mobility). And
third, there must be revolutionary leadership, [ref. 79]
There is disagreement concerning just who in the
countryside are the likeliest early recruits. Migdal finds
that his first two conditions are aost often men in areas of
marginal land or frontiers, having a structure of small
capitalist (land-owning) farmers, pDDr peasants, and sepa-
rate large or wealthy capitalists. Wolf agrees, arguing
that the early recruits in the countryside are likely to be
the land-owning middle peasants, and the "free" (i.e., most
isolated) peasants in remote, peripheral areas. The middle
peasants, with more numerous contacts outside the village
gained through market participation and residence nearer the
towns, are most exposed to the unrest and political ideas of
the cities. At the same time, the jnencumbered peasants in
the peripheral areas enjoy the tactical advantages of
remoteness, defensible terrain, and relative autonomy, and
they are often susceptible to ideology that appeals to their
separateness and religion. 3 ut Jeffrey Paige disagrees,
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insisting that the sharecro pping system (landless peasants)
is the most prone to revolt [rsf. 80].
Where all these arguments converge is in agreeing
that the insurgent recruits are to be found among those
peasants interacting beyoid the Iscal village. Whether
their involvement has made them land-owning beneficiaries of
"the system," or they have become its tsnant-farming
victims, they are the ones to revolt. The reverse is also
trie. The peasant who can "withdraw" from the outside world
and farm for his own family's consumption is least likely to
become an insurgent recruit.
Goran Hyden studied peasants in Tanzania, and in
Africa generally, to conclude that while "economic history
is largely the story of how to capture the peas-
ant s, ... Africa is the only continent where the peasants have
net been captured by othsc social classes." " ref . 81] In
Africa, labor rather than land is the primary factor of
agricultural production, peasants are socially aore indepen-
dent, than their Latin American and Asian counterparts, and
African farmers are less integrated into the cash economy
than are peasants elsewhere.
The extent to which peasant autonomy has been reduced
obviously differs from one African country to another.
[Still,] Although the peasants ar = incorporated into the
larger world economy, and thus interact with other
social classes in that context, their dependence on the
system is marginal. Ihay live in the boundary region of
this system and there they have the unique prerogative




One might argue that k frica is not as different as
Hyden insists— for instants, the world Bank notes that land
is no longer plentiful on aost of the continent. [ ref . 83]
But his observation is valid that peasants vary in relative
autonomy. In describing ths African farmer's attitude
toward innovative agricultural techniques, Hyden might as
well be speaking of attitudes toward joining an insurgent
movement.
Siven their rudimentary technology and the lack of
variety of product among the households, producing the
basic necessities is a cumbersone task. The peasant
invests so much time and effort in it that he is
naturally reluctant to take chances. [ref. 84 ]
The peasant ceases to have an exit option when the
government tax collector and military conscription officer,
the rent-collecting landlord, and the cash market penetrate
the "traditional village. Forced to pay taxes and rent, and
inoreasingly needful of manufactured goods, the peasant must
enter the cash market to sell his orop and handicrafts and
buy other goods.
The factor scale places "exit option" at the stable,
left-hand pole not becaaee such a peasant is likely to
support the government, bit because he is unlikely to join
an insurgent, movement. Abie to retreat to subsistence
farming, he is relatively immune to pressures that drive
others to risk all in a revolt, ^t the other end of the
scale is the condition " vuinerable'^-Hyden 1 s
"captured"--peasants who are dependent upon the world
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outside the village and/or unable to escape demands for cash
taxes, military service, corvee labor, rent, land-redemption
payments, and so forth. Included here are both the
well-off, middle peasants, and the poorest tenant farmers
and agricultural workers. Among the more fortunate, some
may be supportive of the government, but more will be the
ready recruits Wolf and Migdal describe.
3« Two Sources of 3 1:3,5 van^ es
Whereas social cleavagss and the mobilization poten-
tial affect the organizational balance, the next two factors
relate to legitimacy. Harry Eckstein defines legitimacy as
"the extent that a polity is regarded by its members as
worthy of support" [ ref . 35], and Tei 3urr argues that it is
gained at least partly through su::3ss at reducing relative
deprivation [ref. 86]. Thus effective government tends to
enjoy high legitimacy, ani numerous grievances in a society
reflect perceptions of illegitimacy. Here we examine two
key grievances as measures of government effectiveness or
legitimacy.
I FACTOR S-5. Landiessness. I
I 20% 30* H0% 60% I
, ,
-, 2 3 I U I 6--- | 7 8 9 I I
The danger of a major revelation is "substantial"
when landless peasants number 30 percent or more of the




"Land to the Tiller" gained substantial support for
the Chinese and Vietnamese communists among land-hungry
peasants. It was also a central demand of the communist
Farmers* Front in Indonesia, and governmental land reform is
credited with preempting the Huk*s appeal to farmers in the
Philippines. Whether Jeffery Paige is right that the land-
starved, tenant farmer is most prone to revolt, or Wolf and
Migdai are correct that tie land-owning, middle peasants are
the likeliest early insurgent recruits, any rural movement
must eventually acquire wide support among the peasants in
order tc succeed. Tanter and Midlarsky note that
"successful revolutions [iave] occurred in those polities
with a higher degree of land inequality." [ref. 97]
Factor S -5 makes ase of Roy Prosterman's measure of
land inequality to suggest the probability of revolution.
His Index of Rural Instability (IRI) is the percentage of
landless peasants out Df the total population of the
country. An IRI of 303 or greater indicates a "substantial
danger" of a major revolution, while '4 0?S or mere signifies a
"critical danger." 1 o [ref. 88]
l °An IRI of 30, for example, means that 301 of all fami-
lies in tha x society are -enant farmers, landless laborers,
and in other categories 3f those wb.3 work the land but do
not own it. Where the data show sone families in more than
one role— for example, part tenant and part owner-
cultivator—the IRI figure is shown as a range: the lower
figure considers such families proportionately as "owners;"




An examination of calculated IRI*s for ten insurgent
situations in this century suggests thax the relevant range
of variation is from zero to 60 percent, [ref. 39]
Pre-1911 Mexico 62
Pre-1917 Russia 32-47
Pre-1941 China (rice region Drily) 35-45
Pre-1952 Bolivia 50
Pre-1959 Cuba 39




Pre-1980 El Salvador 38 [ref. 90]
Figure 4.1 IRI 7alues fDC Ten Pre-Revolutionary Situations.
The IRI is applicable only if here land is relatively
scarce and there exists some secure means of Land tenure--
prLvate or collective ownsrship. The high significance of
land tenure is amptly deaonstrated for wet rice areas of
Asia. Some scholars insist that Latin Americans do not
revolt for land, but it seems significant that El Salvador
in early 1980 had both ths highest level of landlsssness and
the greatest population density d£ any country in the
region. Only pre-1959 Ciba and pre-1979 Nicaragua had such
high indications of landiessness in this century. [ref. 91]
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Although much land remains undeveloped in Africa,
ths World Bank notes that
Population pressures have existed for many decades in
parts of East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda),
Southern Africa (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), and
West Africa (Mauritania and Niger). There ars important
pockets of high-density settlement in a few countries,
such as Southeastern Nigeria, the Western Highlands of
Cameroon, the Mossi plateau of Upper Volta, and
Senegal's Groundnut Basin. [ref. 92]
Land pressure created by European settlers in areas needed
by an expanding native Kikuyu population in Kenya was a
stimulus to the Mau Mau Rebellion of 1952-1955 [ref. 93].
Fighters in the Mau Mau "Land Freedom Army" formally swore
to "go forward to fight for ths land, the lands of Kirinyaga
that we cultivated, ths lands which were taken by the
Europeans [ref. 94].
In arguing his case, Prostecman distinguishes three
categories of peasant upheavals approximating the concepts
of revolution, independence movement, and turmoil.
1. Category 1 is a conflict in »hich peasants have been
mobilized along class lines, primarily around the
issue of land teure, and sometimes secondarily
around the issue cf agricultural credit.
2. Category 2 is a conflict in rfhich peasants have been
mobilized along geographic or tribal lines, chiefly
around the issue of independence.
3. Category 3 is a riot-like conflict without any clear
structure or issue, stemming chiefly from the common
frustrations cf deep poverty. "ref. 95]
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With poverty widespread in the third world, and
peasants typically unorgani zed, the frustratiaa-aggression
theory suggests that "category 3" turmoil is normal and to
be expected. Prosterman argues that where there are enough
sharecroppers or other landless peasants, and their aggres-
sion is sufficiently politicized, the "category 1"
revolution is apt to supplant the "category 3" riot or lynch
mob. The IRI thus suggests how many landless peasants are
required for this to happen.
This stimulus to insurgency is reduced by successful
land reform, but the effectiveness of on-going programs
appears particularly difficult to evaluate. For example, in
1970 Prosterman considered the reform in Iran to be among
"the half-dozen major non-communist land reforms of this
century [that] have led to large increases in agricultural
production and have furnished a bulwark of political
stability." [ref. 96] By 193 1, he had reevaluated "the
Shah's vaunted 'white revolution 1 [as] little more than a
public relations campaign, actually redistributing land to
only some 15 percent of the landless population..." [ref.
97]
True land reform is a zero-sum proposition where
landlords must lose their property to the new owners. 11
1 l The "green revolution" and other aid and agrarian
reform programs fail to actually redistribute land. Such
efforts may benefit only those able to afford the required
fertilizers, insecticides, and seeds. [ref. 98]
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Since Gracchus first warned the Roman assembly to "relin-
quish a portion cf your wealth lest the whole be taken from
you someday" [ref. 99], governments have been urged to
redistribute land as a palliative to potentially revolu-
tionary farmers. Samuel Huntington argues that "no social
group is mors conservative than a landowning peasantry and
none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too
little land or pays too high a rental." [ref. 100]
The Bolivian Revolution of 1952-1953 massively
redistributed land, often as a result cf spontaneous
seizures rather than at central direction. Before the revo-
lution, about six percent of the farms and ranches
controlled about 92 perceit of the exploited land, and the
peasants actively supported the revolution. More than ten
years later, the Bolivian governme.it was overthrown by a
military coup, and Cuban revolutionary Che 3uevara judged
the country ripe for a second popular revolt. However, the
peasants— in possession of their laii--were uninterested in
supporting Che. [ref. 101]
The successful land reforms in Asia shortly after
World War II were ail externally imposed under circumstances
unlikely to be repeated, but rhey suggest the scale of
successful reform.
1. In Japan, between .larch 1947 and December 1950, and
under the watchful eye of Douglas MacArthur, the
JaDanese government deprived an estimated one million
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landlords of their a states and transformed 90% of all
tenant land in Japan into owner-opperated land. The
IEI value dropped from 28.7 ta 5 percent. There had
been fears at the time that Japan light "run to
communism," but, "land reform in Japan after World
War II inured Japanese peasants to the appeals of
socialism and made them the strongest and most loyal
supporters of conservative parties. [ref. 102]
2. In Korea, at the time of the Japanese surrender, 70%
of the Korean population was considered agrarian, yet
4% of the farm households owned or managed 50% of the
farmland. Only 35.6% of the total arable land was
owner-operated, and a fledgling, socialist "Korean
People's Republic" began imprisoning landlords and
vowing to distribute land free to the farmers. The
U.S. outlawed the "government" and took over all
Japanese land holdings. It sold the Japanese proper-
ties, 15.3% of all farmland in South Korean, and set
a precedent that the Republic later continued. A
U.S. occupation official later concluded that "land
reform in Korea did more, probably, to fortify the
democratic forces than any single move that was made
by the American military government." "ref. 103]
3. In Taiwan, just before the arrival of Chinese fleeing
the mainland, some 55% of the farmland belonged to
cwner-cul tivators . Tenant farmers were paying up to
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70% of their harvest in rent. The Chinese advance
party was originally welcomed as liberators from the
Japanese, but bLoody suppression by the Chinese soon
alienated the nativs-s. However, in the late 1940*3
and early 1950's, the Chinese reduced land rents,
sold public lands, and redistributed additional land
under a 1953 land- t o-the-tilLer act. Whereas only
55% of the' farmland belongs! to owner-cultivators in
1948, 85.6% was so owned by 1959—an IRI of 14.4%.
As in Korea, former landlords were partially compen-
sated with industrial stocks, causing many of them to
shift their activities to industrial development.
The land reforms haze been credited with helping two
million Chinese to control politically some twelve
million Taiwanese. [ref. 134]
| FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization. I
I equitable highly polarizing |
| |- 1 2 3 4 5 5- 7 8 9 | |
Economic development creates or exacerbates situ-
ations of "haves" and "have-nDts," increasing the
probability of insurgency.
Factor S-6, differential modernization, examines the
second major cause of peasant grievances. It derives from
the clear concensus among scholars that rapid economic
3D

develop merit is destabilizing. 12 Eckstein, Gurr, Huntington,
and others agree that the modernizing societies are the most
apt to revolt. Wallace Conroe finds that "the faster (the
slower) the raxe of change in th = modernization process
within any given society, the higher (the lower) the level
of political instability within that society." [ref. 106]
Moreover, modernization invariably benefits some groups,
seotors of the econouy, or regions ovsr others.
"Development tends to cause polarization of wealth and
power." [ref. 107] Where modernization is rapid and polar-
izing in patterns that reinforce geoethnio or other
rivalries, insurgency becomes more likely.
12 As summarized by Huntington, rapid economic growth
raises the potential for political violence in nine ways;
it: (1) disrupts traditional social groupings (family,
class, caste), and thus increases •the number :f individuals
who are declasse. ^ and who are thus in circumstances
conducive to revolutionary protest' ; (2) produces nouveaux
r ic hes who are imperfectly adjusted to and assimilated by
the existing order and who want political power and social
status commensurate with their new economic position; (3)
increases geographical nobility rfhich again undermines
social ties, and, in particular, encourages rapid migration
from rural areas to cities, *hich produces alienation and
political extremism; (4> increases the number of peopl a
whose standard of living is falling, and thus may widen the
gap between rich and poor; (5) increases the incomes of some
people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases
their dissatisfaction with the existing order; (6) requires
a general restriction of consumption in order to promote
investment and thus produces popular discontent; (7)
increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media,
which increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be
satisfied; (8) aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over
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In Zambia, most development has been concentrated in
the northern "copper belt" region aid along the north-south
railway linking the coppar area with seaports in South
Africa. The peasants away from ths right-of-way have been
neglected, many becoming aware of their situation through
seasonal labor opportunitie s in urban areas and on commer-
cial farms. [ ref . 109] In tiny Swaziland, thare is a huga
disparity between urban and rural daveiopment. Residants of
tha Mbabane/Manzini "corridor" number less than 20% of the
population, yet they account for some 66% of all income
[ref. 109]. It remains to be seen if dif
f
ereitial modern-
ization will impel these countries toward political violence
as it has their northern neighDor, Zaire.
4. The Traditional Lavel of Violence
I




1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
| |
"Traditions of am s bearing and bellicosity among
the peasantry versus deep-rooted pacifism, passivity,
fatalism" affects the potential for insurgency "ref. 110].
the distribution of investment and consumption; and (9)
increases capacities for group organization and consequently
the strength of group demands on government, which the
government is unable to satisfy. *ref. 105]
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With Factor S-7 «s begin to consider some human,
material, and geographical variables that facilitate or
obstruct the use of force. Intuitively, a "warlike tradi-
tion," an abundance of available arms, and favorable terrain
are permissive causes of insurgency.
Other things being equal, some societies appear to
be more prone to violence than othsrs. Factor S^lr the
traditional level of viols rice, looks at the frequency with
which violence has previously occurred in a society as a
clue to the future. "Successful violence increases the
likelihood of . its recurrence; the greater the extent of
historical violence, the a ore likel/ it is that some groups
have found it effective." [ref. 111] In Latin America, for
example, the common occurrence of cotips d'etat has made the
coup "as institutionalized a fora of changing governments
[there] as the ballot." [ref. 112] Some scholars look to
harsh environments to breed hardy people well-suited to
violence. "It is natural that countries most suitable to
guerrilla fighting should breed the best guerrilla
fighters." [ref. 113] "Races who live in the tropics, and
in countries fuil of jungis and bush, are timid as compared
with hiilmen and the nomad wanderers of the desert." [ref.
114] Still others examine cultural traditions and note the
passivism of Hindu Indians, or suggest that Buddhism
"spoiled" previously ferooious Mongols, Thai, and Khmer.
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Gurr explains why history is a reasonably reliable
guide.
Populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop,
by an interactive process, a sat of beliefs justifying
violent responses to lepcivation; the French tradition
of urban "revolution" is a striking example, "ref. 115]
B. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
1 • Military Resources.
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The probability of an insurgency appearing is
directly related to the availability of arms and military
skills in the country. Once an uprising begins, the poten-
tial for insurgent success relates iirectly to the arms and
skills resources of the insurgents.
The training, experience, mi arms that World War
Two spread through the third world certainly influenced the
wave of rebellions, revelations, arid civil wars that swept
the region soon after. The core oc the insurgent movement
in Malaya was the former anti-Japanese guerrillas trained
and eguipped by Britain's Force 136 [ref. 116], and
Americans originally provided some aid to the Viet Minh.
Demobilized veterans played very active roles in the inde-




Factor S-8 considers the supply of ajrms_and_militar£
skills in a country to be an indicator of the probability
and likely magnitude of political violence. Initially all
skills and arms should be considered, including those in
government hands. This is because in civil violence the
government is usually responsible for most Df the human
casualties (the insurgents tend to account for most of the
property damage) [ ref . 118], and because defections and
attacks on government arsenals serve to redistribute the
nation's military resourcss. Defections do the same for
expertise.
Gurr points out. that "the most fundamental human
response to the use of fDcce is coua terf orce, " and Morrison
and Stevenson conclude tiat "greater coercive potential
means a greater potentiality that taose who have guns will
use them, and -hat those who have guns used against them
will retaliate." [ref. 119] Considering the present weak-
ness of many third-world (and most African) staces, domestic
violence is likely to increase cvsr coming years as the
regimes continue to arm themselves. When, or whether, these
governments can reach levels whers further increases in
repressive capacity will reduce the violence is uncertain.
Chester Crocker, now Assistant Secretary cf State
for Africa, and Michael Samuels notel in 1979 that "Africans
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are now arming themselves at an unprecedented rate." 13 [ref.
123] Th'ey ware not speaking solely of government efforts.
Rather, they concluded that more arms and money were
besoming available to "movements and regimes with an
interest, in challenging the existing order," and that "the
balance between the guerrillas and bLack government security
forces moves steadily in favor of the former...." [ref.
123 ]
There is yet another way in which the supply of arms
contributes to violence. Government forces, fearful of
weapons in the hands of potential rebels, sometimes move to
collect them— igniting the very violence they fear. In
1972, Manila began to confiscate pri/ately-owned firearms in
order tc end the "Wild West" atmosphere throughout the
Philippines. The southern Muslims, however, saw the move as
aimed specifically at them. The result was a resurgence of
the separatist movement. * ref. 124] In Indonesia in January
1965, ccmmunist party leader Aidit called for arming "no
less than 5 million organized workers and 10 million organ-
ized peasants" in response to the British Duiid up in
l3U.S. Government figures comparing conventional arms
transfers to Sub-Saharaa Africa during 1972-1976 and
1977-1981 reveal that Soviet deliveries of armored vehicles
and artillery more than doubled [ref. 121]. Dimitri Simes
calculates that between 19 72 and 1976, Soviet arms deliv-
eries to Africa "increased almost 23 times, from $55 million
to over $1 billion, even before the Soviets invested more
than 31 billion in military aid to Ethiopia." " ref . 1221 In
addition to the traditional major arms exporters, China and
South Africa are now aggressively pursuing arms sales.
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neighboring Malaysia. As the Indonesian armed forces had
long been hostile to irregular ansi formations, the inci-
dent may have encouraged the army*s bloody suppression of
communists following the A idit-inspired coup a few months
later, [ref. 125]
Once an armed uprising has begun, however, Factor
S-3 must be calculated on a different basis. The regime and
the insurgents will both seek to increase the arms they have
available. The level of violence is certain to rise, and
military skills will be acquired through experience.
Beginning with the armed struggle. Factor S-8 considers the
arms and military skills available t3 the insurgents.
2. Isolation and Accessabi liry.
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.
impenetrable /none porous/plentiful
FACTOR S-10. Terrain S Lines of Communications.
open/good rough/poor
I
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I
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Open borders that offer sanctuary and supplies to
insurgent forces, and (within the country) inaccessible
terrain affording good concealment, to the guerrillas, are
conditions favoring insurgent success.
Two aspects of geography are of proven significance
to insurgent situations. F§.ct?_r_S;9 considers the country's
external isolation (borders and sanotuaries) while Factor
S-1 examines the internal accessibility and concealment
jterr ain^.and. li n es^of comma nica tion^.
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The incumbent government has important advantages,
ana except for the final phases of a successful insurgency--
such as when Phnom Penh, Cambodia, *as surrounded in 1975
—
its ability to seek and receive external aid is generally
independent of terrain or Location. 3n the other hand, it
is critical to the insurgents whether they can make use of
friendly border areas for training, rest, and resupply, and
whether the terrain inside their country enables them to
avoid detection and evade superior government forces.
According to Bernard Fall,
An active sanctuary is a territory contiguous to a
rebellious area which, though ostensibly not involved in
the conflict, provides the rebel side witn shelter,
training facilities, e^iipment, and if it can get away
with it— troops. [ref. 126]
Due to porous, unpoliced borders, sanctuaries were
plentiful in Vietnam but generally not in peninsular Malaya.
In Sarawak, the communist insurgent threat diminished
substantially in the mid-1950's when Indonesia denied
further use of sanctuaries in its tsrritory. Ihe Algerian
FLN established sanctuaries in Libya, Morocco, and Egypt,
until the French "Morice Line" effectively closed the
borders. In Kenya, the Kikuyu Man Sau had none. Today, the
anti- insurgent foroes in El Salvador are attempting to close
off guerrilla access to neighboring Nicaragua.
Rough terrain, providing concealment to the insur-
gents and restricting and slowing the movements of
anti-insurgent forces, seems essential in this age of
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aircraft and helicopters. Although dispersion, night move-
ments, camouflage, and other tactics can partially off-set
the government's typical advantages in transportation and
surveillance, an absence of rugged terrain reduces the size
of units that can safely move about as well as the size and
locations of base camps. For exampla, once the Portuguese
acquired helicopters for use in Angola, they virtually ran
tha HPLA and their villages out of the country [ref. 127].
The Orange River and desert conditioas of northwestern South
Africa might prove effective barriars to guerrilla infiltra-




V. S OVER NME NT_iND_INS OR GE»T_FACTORS
Whereas the situational factors describe predisposing
conditions in the social and environmental arena, the
government and insurgent factors relate to anDce immediate
causes and to the actors 5f an insjrgency. The sets are
mirror-imaged, and eaoh pair of one government and one
insurgent factor will be discussed together.
A. ORGANIZATIOH
Three pairs cf factors add to chose already presented in
describing the organizational strength of the government and
the insurgents. The first pale addresses the centralization
cf top leadership as enhancing efficient decision-making,
planning, and constancy of effort. The second pair looks at
existing and potential participation as a measure of organi-
zational scope. The third pair concerns the loyalty and
discipline of leaders aid members alike.
1 . Con cent r ation_ of _Au thocity
FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.
unitary diffused
FACTOR 1-1. Unity of Command.
hostile rivals cooperative unitary
j
<\ 2 - |— 3 U 5 5 7- | --8 9 |
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Increasing centralization of authority enhances
efficient decision- making, planning, and constancy of
effort.
Addressing the tasks of long-term economic develop-
ment, Samuel Huntington makes an argument that applies to
counter-insurgency as wall.
Fundamental changes in society and politics come from
the purposeful actions of men, not in unchanging law.
In addition, men must have ths power to effect change
and hence authority mast be concentrated in some
determinate individual or group of men. [ref. 128]
Social and economic reform is normally facilitated
by a relatively high concentration of power in the
political system. Meaningful land reforms, for
instance, are almost never enacted by democratically
elected parliaments; they are imposed by some undemoc-
ratic source of authorit y . . .. The can tralization of power
nay also be necessary for the government to maintain the
control over violence that is essential to carry through
major reforms. No reform occurs without violence.
:ref. 129]
Factcr_G_2l assesses the government's concentration
of_authority (This is not a measure of power :r effective-
ness inasmuch as it examines neither the available resources
nor the performance of governmental institutions in carrying
out their instructions.) At the scale's left end is the
limiting case of a single, unchallenged individual holding
ultimate and sweeping power. Ideally, he would be a charis-
matic figure inspiring national approval and unity. The
opposite pole is diffused Leadership. Between them we might
list the following common models of government in order of
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increasingly centralized authority: democracy (parliamen-
tary, presidential), single-party state (populist,
vanguard), military ruls (council, strongman), and personal
rule. Another scheme might include confederation, federa-
tion, and unified stats. Actual states combine these
analytical types, and within a variety of systems there
often arises a supreme leader.
A supreme leader's authority is not necessarily
unrestrained, and a small cligue--especially if sharing a
strong commitment to a comaon ideology--may prove more deci-
sive and constant. The typology of personal rulers in
Africa by Robert Jackson and Carl RDsberg well illustrates
the variety of authority and perogative.
in effective ruler may be a political policeman with
sufficient power and authority to preside over the game
"i.e., political infighting] and keep it orderly--in a
regime we shall term "princely rule." He may be a
political strongman who at least temporarily succeeds in
dominating everyone else and in effect transforming
politics into administrat ion--"autocratic rule." Or he
may be a charismatic personality wio can convert politi-
cians into missionaries and politics into a crusade--
"prophetic rule." The deterioration of some personal-
ized games into fights can be oaused by the rulers
themselves in a wholly abusive and unrestrained
Banner— the case of "tyrannical rule." [ rsf . 130]
In Africa today, Malawi is probably the state with
the most centralized deci sion-makia g
.
The conservative
autocrat, President Kamazu 3anda, determines virtually
everything of significance. Elsewhere personal rulers
seldom are as unrestrained. To stay in power, they regu-
larly favor the armed forces, ruthlessly crush any potential
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challengers, and allow no criticism. The ruler's tactics of
co-option, consultation, agrsement, and patronage, while
preventing a too-powerfaL rival from emerging, impose
constraints upon his personal perogative.
Factor 1-1 applies the same principle of unity_of
com mand to the insurgents. Movements often are factious, 1 *
thus the leadership may be characterized as "hostile,
rivals, cooperative, or unified." Common organizational
models on a scale of increasing concentration include:
traditional (tribal council, hierarchy)
,
party-army (united
front, party or military high command, tiny clique), and a
single leader. Again, actual cases vary from these analyt-
ical types, and movements may initially co-opt traditional
authority structures and develop more modern organization
later, [ref. 13 2]
Robert Scalapino finds that communist movements and
regimes tend to evolve fron collective to individual leader-
ship. Supreme figures irose in Zhiaa, North Korea, and
Vietnam. As they aged, each country tended to drift back
toward collective leadership. [ref. 133] Perhaps the armei
struggle demands concentrated leadership and puts a higher
premium en a single, charasmatic individual than does the
subsequent consolidation and rule.
1 *In Angola, where three major indigenous movements led
the anti-Portuguese resistance, John Marcum recorded no less
than 87 nationalist movements "ref. 131].
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Useful in gauging the personal authority of Asian
communist leaders is the typology of cadres that Scalapino
provides. The "ideologue" is an intellectual, although he
may not have come from the intellectual class. His is a
combination of resentment over the status quo and desire for
change, a conviction that Marxism is scientific, and a
desire to play the role of philosoph=r-king. He is sincere
an3 serious but lacks mass appeal anl is often uncomfortable
in an open arena. He is particularly given to factionalism.
The "activist" is attracted by the opportunities to use his
organizational and leadership skills. He is motivated to
act, often finds theory boring, and is frequently an extro-
vert and natural leader. The "careerist" comes in great
variety. He is attracts! by opport unities for education,
status, escape from monotony, or the chance to lead. Should
the party come to power, new careerists appear: opportunists
and technocrat-administrators. " ref . 134] Sot only the
style, but seemingly the authority of each of these types
must vary.
The corollary here is that disunity in the leader-
ship can greatly reduce the insurgent movement's potential.
The Algerian FLN suffered from fragmented leadership.
The creation of area commands, *hich was intended to
facilitate the armed confrontation against France,
tended also to produce factional allegiances, jurisdic-
tional disputes, and petty revolutionary states. This
group of phenomena, which has been given the term
wiilayasme, fragmented the FLN organization to a consid-
erable extent. There was also the conflict that




(Armee Nat ion ale Polulairei stationed outside the
Algerian borders, and the combatant, guerilla forces of
the ALN (Algerie Liberation National) operating from
within, a conflict which the French helped to exacer-
bate, but did not cause, through their imposed system of
land blockades. [ ref . 13 5]
In Mozambique, a schism developed within FRELIMO
between those leaders located in nsighboring Tanzania and
those within the Portuguese colony * ref . 136]. The front
organization in South Vietnam was shoved aside by the North
Vietnamese after the fall of SaigoQ. The isolated, regional
communist groups in Malaya sometimes defected en masse. And
a sympathetic account of a movement in Brazil years ago
painted a picture of disunity and weakness.
The overwhelming defect of the Brazilian revolutionary
movement is the disunited stats of the revolutionary
organizations and their disagreement over attitudes and
objectives. Within this disagreement there is an
intense struggle for Leadership going on. Each organi-
zation is tactily claiming ths leadership of the
revolution for itself, and this makes it difficult to
discover a common denominator among those who ' are
prepared to fight against our common enemy. This is an
Dbjective feature of ths Brazilian revolution and of the
special conditions in which it is evolving. [ref. 137]
2. Potential for Participation
FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.
open
I
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Opportunities foe upward nobility provide strong
inducements to recruitment.
The next two factors focus on the question of why
people join the government or the i&surgents; a substantial
advantage here is the best indicatioa of ultimate success in
organization building. Df course, each side has its volun-
teers and its conscripts. 15 The guerrillas, for example, may
initially force a youth to join. After indoctrination, and
compulsory involvement in illegal acts which he is told
leave him no other option, he stays without being physically
coerced. Volunteers, 01 the other hand, may be seeking
material, social, or status rewards.
Recruits are attracted with a mixture of induce-
ments, but we are primarily concerned here with upward
mobility. Samuel Huntington, for example, argues that two
variables— socioeconomic and political mobility-intervene
i 53obert Thompson observed thrse types of communist
recruits in Vietnam and Malaya. The "naturals" were those
for whom "Communism, with its strength of purpose and disci-
pline, with the chances of promotion in its monolithic
structure, with its security of organization and its
conspiratorial secrecy, with its belief in inevitable
viotory and its sense of political p:>wer, offers them their
opportunity." The "converted" "include those who join
because of government excesses or abuses of po wer . . .[ also ]
those who are persuaded to join the insurgent ranks because
they have close friends in them." Iiis group includes those
who join the "bandwagon" if they see the insurgents winning.
Finally, the "deceived" are those who joined for legitimate
reasons (e.g., to participate in the anti-Japanese or anti-
colonial resistance) , and those who are abducted, forced to




to affect how discontent arising from tha strains of
modernization becomes political violence. Factor S-2 (the
mass-elite gap) evaluates a group* 3 access to the socioeco-
nomic elite, thus Factor G-2 stresses political mobility.
Again, as Huntington writes,
Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and
media exposure all give cise to enhanced aspirations and
expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize
individuals and groups into politics. [ ref . 139]
In many third-world countries, there are few oppor-
tunities for personal advancement outside of the government
bureaucracy. Socioeconomic and political mobility blend
together, as Jackson and Rosberg relate.
State power in African countries has been che major
arena of privilege—the religious, business, and other
arenas provide fewer opportuniti?s--and it has been more
accessible to ambitious men of humble origin. [ref.
140]
Because of the general poverty ini underdevelopment of
African countries and the restricted scope of the
private sector, government has become the main dispenser
of patronage and is perceived as sich. The interest in
patronage resources is iirected specifically at persons
with power, positions, and influence in the ruling coun-
cils of the state--that is, officeholders in the
cabinet, the party, the army, the civil service, and
parastatal organizations. The officeholders tend to
monopolize the kinds of goods ani services thaz other
individuals and groups need or want; a marked feature of
pre-industrial societies is the treatment of
governmental offices as entitlements. [ref. 141]
The demand for political participation quickly
outstrips the absorptive capacity of the weak political
institutions typical of unierdevelopsd countries. If polit-
icized individuals and groups are ier.ied "regime access,"
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they may turn to the insurgents. Thus, Lucian Pye found
that Malayan communist party members joined the uprising "on
an endless quest for advancement and personal security."
[ref. 142]
An insurgent organization's capacity for accomo-
dating these volunteers is the product of tha size of tha
organization and its criteria for participation. Tha
Chinese communists created a vast organization capable of
indefinite expansion through associated grassroots,
special-interest groups ( = .g., for women, youths, farmers)
Douglas Pike describes how the Viet Cong emulated the
Chinese, building an organization with echelons at national,
interzonal, zonal, provincial, district, and village levels,
[ref. 1431
However, Jeffrey Race makes it clear that we must
speak of more that political participation. It must be
meaningful participation - providing benefits to both the
individual and the organization. \ccordir.g to Race, Viet
Cong recruitment was based upon an exchange cf aateriai and
status rewards by the organization Eor certain behavior by
individuals. [raf. 1'44] In contrast, Race believes -hat
President Diem's institutions were "hollow shells" that
failed to rival those of the V3 insurgents.
Initially, the 7 iet Cong relied upon material
inducements. Seme tenant farmers probably joined the move-
ment in exchange for promises of Land--and some land was
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redistributed. Later, the insurgents provided mobility and
status by installing individuals in positions previously
filled by government officials. Tie organization not only
duplicated the government positions, but it expanded them
and placed more authority at lower levels. The insurgents
has a continuous system of promotion from the lowest to the
highest levels, whereas rural elites were effectively
blocked from central positions in the Saigon government.
Later, when the rcovemeit gained aide support, indirect
rewards came into play. Peasants then joined in order to




and 17 2, re 3,1 me access and up_ward
mobility require the same sort of examination as does Factor
S-2, the mass-elite gap. We are interested in the groups
appealed to and those discriminated against. Another of
Gurr's simple scoring systems may be useful here. Defining
political discrimination as "systeuatic limitation in form,
norm, or practice of social groups' opportunities to partic-
ipate in political activities or to attain elite positions
on the basis of ascribed characteristics," Gurr uses four
levels of intensity.
1. Seme significant political elite positions are closed
tc the group, or some participatory activities (party
membership, voting, etc.) [are closed].
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2. Most or all political elits positions ace closed or
most participatory activies, Dr scae of both.
3. Most or ail political elite positions and some
participatory activities are closed.
4. Most or all political elite positions and most or all
participatory activities are closed. [ref. 145]
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Defections shift resources from one side to the
other and suggest the levels of iiscipline within each
organization.
No matter how centralized the leadership and vast
the membership, discipline remains essential to successful
insurgency. It is a basic difference between an insurgent
organization and bandits or terrorists. Thus, indiscrimi-
nate, undisciplined terrorism by the FLN in Algeria and the
CTs in Malaya was detrimental to their cause.
Scholars have found defections to be an early and
good indicator of prospects for an insurgency. Crane
Brinton described the transfer of allegiance of the intel-
lectuals as "in some respects the most reliable of the
symptoms we are likely to meet." "ref. 146] Harry Eckstein
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explained their consequs nces to the government side.
"Internal wars are unlitely wherever the cohesion of an
elite is intact, for the simple reason that insurgent forma-
tions require leadership and other skills and are unlikely
to obtain them on a larga scale without soma significant
break in the ranks of an elite." ' ref . 147] John Gillis
observed tnat defections leave those who remain behind in a
"state of confusion and despair" [rs£. 148], aid Katherine
Chorley summed up by saying that "whatever government or
party has the full allegiance of a country's armed forces is
to all intents and purposes politically impregnable." [ref.
149 ]
In Vietnam and Malaya, Thompson urged that amnesties
and other measures be used to induce insurgent defections.
The main base of a successful psychological warfare
campaign will depend oi a clear aid precise government
surrender policy toward the insurgents, Such a policy
has three main aims: (1| to encourage insurgent surren-
ders; (2) to sow dissension. between insurgent
rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to creat an
image cf government both to the insurgents and to the
population which is both firm and efficient bur at the
same time just and generous. [ref. 15C]
Defections also reflect levels of morale, percep-
tions of who is winning, the distribution cf resources, and
other variables. A recruit from among the neutral populace
is a plus for one side, bit a defection is also a minus for
the other. Factor s_G-3_and_I -3 can reflect the state of
discipline by noting whetier or not defections are taking





B. LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS
Two pairs cf government and insurgent factors serve to
examine legitimacy. The first argues that a "oneness"
between a group and its Leaders is a powerful source of
legitimacy. The second argues that a legitimate regime is
one that is effective at the tasks people expect of their
government.
1 . Identification with the Reqine or Rebels
( ,
FACTOR G-4. Origin 5 Indigenous Authority
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FACTOR 1-4. Ideology > Appeal.
fragile strong
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The origins of state institutions and the back-
grounds of its leaders shape the degree to which people
identify with and support a regime. Ideology solidifies an
insurgent movement and enhances its Legitimacy.
Two methods useful for estimating government legiti-
macy focus upon the historical origins of political
institutions or the backgrounds of tae leaders. Ted Gurr's
seven-point scale assumes chat institutions whioh are native
in origin, or at least adapted by natives to fit local
circumstances, are mere legitimate ii the people's eyes than
are foreign imports. 4is concept concentrates upon polit-
ical form and seems to slight the important question of who
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actually wields power. Crawford filing's eight-fold scale
examines both the power La indigenous hands and the degree
to which territorial borders are of historical or (better
still) self-determined origin. Young's formula may put more
stress on state borders than is justified if considering the
potential for domestic conflict. Dn balance, Young's seems
the more substantial and useful of the two; it is used with
Factor G-U to indicate the origin o£ the goverament and the
degree of indigenous authority.
With either scale, the higier the value the more
legitimate the regime appears to be. Gurr's assumes that
institutions of autochthiaous (indigenous) origin which
have slowly evolved are more legitimate than those suddenly
implanted from abroad. His seven conditions are:
1. Seven: Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive
and autochthonous ; reformations, if any, had indige-
nous roots (although limitei foreign elements may
have been assimilated into indigenous institutions).
2. Six: Institutions are a nixture of substantial
autochthinous and foreign elements, e.g. they are
polities with extern ally-derived parliamentary and/or
bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional
monarchy.
3. Five: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin,
were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and
have been adapted over time to indigenous political
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conditions. (Adaptation is either the modification
of regime institutions themselves or development of
intermediate institutions in order to incorporate
politically the bulk of the papulation.)
U. Four: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin,
have been adapted over time to indigenous political
conditions, but were inculcated under the tutelage of
a foreign power rather thai chosen by indigenous
leaders of their own volition.
5. Three: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin,
were deliberately otiosen by indigenous leaders, but
they have not been adapted over time to indigenous
political conditions.
6. Two: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin,
were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign
power, and they have not been adapted to indigenous
political conditions.
7. One: Institutions are imposed by, and maintained
under threat of sanctions by, foreign powers
(including polities under colonial rule as of [now],
[ref. 151 ]
The Young scale implies tiat native control and
traditional (or seif-det ecu ined) borders are signs of high
legitimacy.
1. Eiaht: Cultural sel f-determin at ion states. (e.g.,
Pakistan, Bangladeshi, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia).
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2. Seven: Traditional states (having escaped formal
colonialism), (China: transformed; Iran,
Afghanistan, and Ethiopia: kingdom overthrown;
Thailand and Japan: monarch's powers reduced).
3. Six: Historical states (former kingdoms) affected by
colonial experience. (Kingioms^ destroyed by colo-
nials in Libya, Madagascar, and Burma; kingdoms
destroyed by nationalist movenent in Tunisia, Rwanda,
Burundi, Egypt, Vietnam; kingdoms survive in Morocco,
Swaziland, Kuwait, Dman, Qatar, and Nepal).
4. Five: Colonial states with historical personality.
(Algeria, Syria, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka).
5. Four: Arbitrary colDnial units, indigenous successors
to power. (A large category including Nigeria,
Zaire, Tanzania, Cameroon, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Jordan).
6. Three: Homeland states. (for diaspora: Israel and
Liberia) .
7. Two: Colonial units, African or Asian numerically-
dominant immigrant power-holders. (Guyana. Jamaica,
Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Singapore).
3. One: Historically arbitrary, immigrant dominated.
(Most of Latin Aaerica and Soath Africa). [ref. 152]
Insurgents gain legitimacy in the first instance if
the y oppose an illegitina te regiae. They advance their
standing by goading the government into using excessive
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violence or repressive coitrols, into accepting a tainted
relationship with a foreign patron, )r into diverting scarce
resources to a military buildup and away from projects which
address the society's problems. Insurgents also legitimate
themselves by incorporating popular traditions and grie-
vances into their progran. Thus, the Chinese communists
I
-j
emphasized their nationalism and closeness to the masses,
and African rebels have made use of spirit mediums and
magic.
The Gurr and Young scales baing inappropriate for
the rebels. Factor Ir4, suggests that ideology be the focus
of attention.
The adoption of a new political and ideological designa-
tion formally provides an unestablished elite with
internal bonds and external boundaries--with an enhanced
capacity to offset its regional, tribal, religious,
generational, and educational diversity, a conmon dimen-
sion along which to relate to Die another, and the
corporate capacity to distinguish Dr separate themselves
from others. One might hypothesize that, other things
being egual, the less established an elite the greater
the propensity to adopt political and ideological desig-
nations that sharply distinguish them from their more
culturally and socially secure political rivals and the
iatter f s international supporters. [ref. 153]
A strong ideology has important advantages.
1. It could establish linkage to a powerful foreign
patron.
2. It differentiates the insurgents from their enemies,
especially the regime.
3. Association with a purportedly authoritative ideology
confers status on the believers.
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4. It may provide "a formal set of ideological, stra-
tegic, and regime references" of use to a new elite
unfamiliar with eaoh other and the tasks they face.
5- It provides an entre to target groups of like mind.
6. It may be viewed as a quasi-magical solution to
desperate men faoing toagh challenges, including the
problem of organizing themselves. [ ref . 154]
These potential values of an ideology provide
criteria for use with Faotor__I-U, idQpXpqy, and a2£eal..
Whsre significant advantages acrue from its use, the
ideology should be considered a plus for the rebels.
^
2. Evaluati ng Performance
FACTGR G-5. Rural Services.
effective ineffective
FACTOR 1-5. Administration in Rebel Areas,
ineffective effective
16Kerneth Jowitt believes he sses the attraction that
Marxism-Leninism holds for Africans. "'Scientific
socialism,' or ' Marxism-Leninism, ' with its emphases on the
heroic role of cadres, ths sign if ic a.ice of the party leader,
its paternalistic concern with welfare, and substantive
rather than procedural orientations, fits more readily with
African traditional and oolonial experiences than ic the
procedural and individualistic emphases of liberal or social
democratic political and =oonomic teaents." [ref. 155]
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A leadership^ ef f ectiveness in dealing with tasks
the people consider important and appropriate is another
measure of legitimacy.
Aspirations and needs should be studied for the
specific country at issue, and for the social groups being
evaluated, but two examples of such concerns are provided.
verage Av erage



















Maintain Status Quo or No Fears
Figure 5.1 Average Persoial Concerns.
Hadley Cantril coiiectsd survey data for over 20,000
people in 13 countries over a six-ysar period ending in the
mii-1960's. Figure 5.1 shows the percentages of responses
grouped according to several general categories. [ref. 156]
A second, country-specific example comes from a
survey of 114 people in 3hana in 197U and 1975. Asked,
"What do you expect the government to do for you?" the
people responded (answers given by five percent or more of
those interviewed) as given in Figur= 5.2. [ref. 157]
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Guarantee employment and reduce the cost of living 23.7%
Provide housing 17.5
Provide better roads 1U.0
Provide free education 12.3
Provide more and better food 6.1
Provide more health clinics 5.3
Figure 5.2 Ghana Survey: "The Government Should...".
We might compare these concerns with a final list,
this one of areas in which "government efficiency or ineffi-
ciency in providing services [was] significant during
insurgencies." [ref. 158]
Providing justice at the local level.
Implementing land reform.
Controlling of land rent and interest rates.
Providing security against outlaws.
Processing documents and certificates (red tape).
Reducing graft and petty thievery by local government.
Providing educational facilities and teachers.
Providing health services at reasonable prices.
Providing transportation and agricultural storage.
Pigure 5.3 Key Government Services during an Insurgency.
These data convey an impression of the areas in
which the people look to the government for help. Results
presumably go a long way toward establishing the regime's
legitimacy. Unfortunately, a government that is "too effec-
tive" at some of these tasks can undermine itself as surely
as if it did nothing. An example is education.
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Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions;
alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan
soups; alienated primary school Leavers engage in more
frequent but less significant forms of political unrest,
[ref- 159]
If a government buys trouble by educating its citi-
zens, it might seem wiser not to do so. Introducing Western
education in Vietnam is frequently cited as one of the
things the French contribited to taeir own undoing there,
[ref. 160 1 But a government that fails to educate its people
is depriving them of a muoh-valued good, and it is giving
the insurgents a key grievance as well as a vehicle for
their use in indoctrinating the people.
Education is so widely regarded as an essential first
step for individual socio-economic advancement that one
can infer deprivation aaong the uneducated, and among
the parents of children who cannot attend sc&ooi if not
among the children themselves. "ref. 161]
Although denying education directly contributes to
political instability, providing it is destabilizing only to
the degree that educated people are unable to find employ-
ment and are increasingly aware of inequities in the
society. The goal is not to maximize education, but to have
it grow in step with job opportunities in an expanding
economy.
A second area of difficult choices for the govern-
ment, is reform. Often badly neeiei, it may be useful in
preventing or combatting an insurgency. It may also be too
costly or unnecessary, and if ioie under pressure from
events the demands cf the insurgents may only increase, or
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there may occur a counter-revolutionary backlash. Thus,
Huntington advises the Scuth Africans to adopt a "Fabian
strategy" of steady but gradual reforms because "substantial
reform- .. requires a substantial pericd of time for implemen-
tation" and should be aocomplishei from a position of
strength [ref. 162].
Factors G-5 and 1-5 , call foe evaluations of govern-
ment and insurgent performance at providing services and
34* ifi istjerin<? the rural areas under their control. Programs
out of balance with otier projects and trends (e.g.,
educating or training too aany people for the available job
opportunities) are indicative of poor effectiveness. Reform
implemented quickly, at great cost, and under visible pres-
sure must be carefully exanined to letermine if the results
strengthen or weaken popular perceptions of the regime.
C. COERCION
The remaining four pairs of fictors measure coercive
potential and performance. The armsd forces and police (or
the guerrillas) , along with aid provided by external actors,
determine much of the pDt=atiai. Ancther element reflecting
both potential and perf ormance--is population control.
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FACTOR 1-6. » Liberated Areas.
none defended
-.7 8 9 I
Population controls are advantages in insurgent
situations.
Factors G-6 and 1-5 address each side's control over
portions of the population and territory. In the case of
the government, we measure control on a scale from "weak" to
"totalitarian," and the example of the People's Republic of
China serves as a standard by whioi to judge totalitarian
technique. For the insurgents, the existence of "defended
liberated areas" is an indication of substantial coercive
capabilities and control. Where information is available,
the insurgents' population controls within liberated areas
can be evaluated like those of the government.
Great government control in China is achieved
through the use of officiaL structure, traditions and sanc-
tions, and unofficial grassroots organizations. The armed
forces, puiic security (police) personnel, militia, and a
maze of organizations and committees share responsibility
for public order to an extent uncommon in the West. To the
degree that the Ministry of Pubiio Security takes the lead
in this area, its hierarchy is the structure of control. It
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includes the ministry headquarters, departments, bureaus,
subbureaus, and stations, aided by local organizations and
individual cadres or activists.
The public security station--the basic element of
this structure-- has sweeping responsibilities.
The arch criminal [as of 1990] was the "counter-
revolutionary," a vague term that could be applied to
any troublemaker, giving the police considerable lati-
tude beyond the restrictions on their powers. The
station's household section maintained a registry of all
persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages,
and divorces were recorded and confirmed through random
household checks. The station rejuiated all hotels and
required visitors who remained beyond a certain number
of days to register with it. It also controlled all
theaters, cinemas, raiio equipment, and printing presses
to regulate gatherings a. nd censor information reaching
the people. [ref. 163]
Additionally, the police control aLl changes of residence,
limiting urbanization by denying permission to move from
rural areas to the towns aid cities.
The police and other cadres use a variety of sanc-
tions re maintain control, many Df them expanding upon
traditional Chinese methods. Collective reponsibility makes
groups responsible for the behavior of individual members.
Mutual surveillance capitalizes on a tradition of social and
political conformity, aid— by actually penetrating house-
holds ar.d families— exceeds anything achieved prior to
communist rule. Secret police operations utilize plain
clothes agents at public places (e.g., bus and railway
stations), "roving spies" within factories and other work
places, and informants who denounce "bad elements" and help
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sucveil suspected political criminals. "Youths aspiring to
be Communist Youth Leagua (CYL) nembers or CYL members
aspiring to be party membars commonly cooperated as infor-
mants and agents for the police." [ref. 164] The Xinhua
(New China News) Agency in 1983 advised the police to eradi-
cate the use of torture ("a chronic and stubborn disease")
to extract confessions. * ref. 165] Most revealing of the
methods used to control citizens was the technique of public
criticism.
"Struggle sessions" were held to parsuade, educate, and
criticize an offender, who was undar tremendous pressure
to admit guilt and criticize hiisalf or herself. The
accused understood that confession was rewarded with
leniency, while failing to confess was evidence of a
"bad attitude" deserving sevare punishment. Denouncing
family and friends was a meritorious way to get ahead.
Those suspected of criminal activity or harboring coun-
terrevolutionary thoughts were watched constantly. The
social ostracism was sevare, and freguently those under
suspicion for some minor infraction buckled under the
pressure and committed or were judged to commit a
serious offense. Treatment was unequal; those with
influence were able to flaunt tha system while others
less fortunate received harsh punishaent. [raf. 166]
The police could adaiaistrativelf sentence "vagabonds,
people who have no propar occupation, and peopla who repeat-
edly breach public order" to "readucation through labor,"
generally for two years. "Cappel" individuals, those
deprived of political rights, would raceive less pay for the
sane work, were denied nedical servicas free to others, and
along with their families wera discriminated against




The state structure is extended by the grassroots
organizations, including neighborhood committees, residents'
committees, and residents 1 small groups. Mediation and
conciliation committees intervene to settle disputes. Here
again, the authority of these civilian, unofficial mediators
is substantial.
The Chinese mediator ma/ merely perform the function of
an errand boy who maintains contact between parties who
refuse to talk to one another. At the other end of the
spectrum, he may not only establish communication
between parties, but may also define the issues, decide
questions of fact, specifically reoommend the terms of a
reasonable settlement - perhaps avan give a tentative or
advisory decision - an mobilize such strong political,
economic, social and moral pressires upon one or both
parties to leave little option bat that of " voluntary"
acquiescence. [ref. 163]
Control achieved through voluntary compliance is
preferable to police stats tactics since material resources
are net required. Still, where the state has achieved high
control through coercion, and has tie resources to continue
doing so, coercion appears to outweigh legitimacy. South
African dominance by 4.5 million whites in a country of 27.7
million can hardly be legitimate, but the bleak prospects
for overcoming state control keep the regime in power.
Liberated areas are regions 3f the country where the
insurgents exercise authority comparable to that of the
government. The areas are far more than "bases," which
typically are not defended and must remain secret to be
usable. The existence of liberated areas means that a state
of "dual sovereignty" exists, government forces are unable
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to enter portions of the countrysiie, end the situation
resembles civil war more than revolution. In China, the
ccamunists established their most secure liberated areas at
Yenan following the Long larch. The Malayan CTs, on the
other hand, never succeeds! in creating any liberated areas,
although they had many jungle bases.
FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces and PoLice.
strong weak
I
! 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR 1-7. Guerrillas.
weak strong
j 1 2 3 4 5 o 7 8 9 |
FACTOR G-8. External lid.
unneeded plenty some none
,
<| 2 | 3 4 5 5 7 | 8 9 \
FACTOR 1-8. External lid.
none some plenty unneeded
I
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The go vernment-t o -insurg snts troop ratio and
external assistance are standard iniicators of the coercive
balance.
Fac2ors_G27_ and_I-7 are of some value separately,
bur together they form the more useful £atio_of troops
between the two sides. The size of its forces are useful in
calculating the government's deterrent to an insurgent
threat and also in estimating the overall level of violence
to expect. Political vioLence tends to be greatest in coun-
tries with medium-sized military ani security forces, and
less in those with either small or very larae establishments
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(see Factor S-8) . [ref. 169] But the more useful rules of
thumb concern the ratio of government-to-insurgent forces.
Calculating that the government troop advantage
during the Malayan Emergency grew steadily from about 5-to-1
initially to over 25-to-1 toward the end, and that the same
ratio in Vietnam was over 50-to-1 initially but dropped just
as steadily to about 10-to-1 by 1955 (when CJ.S. combat
troops began arriving), Thompson dre* a important lesson.
There are many who say that a government cannot win
an insurgency unless it has a favourable strength ratio of
at least ten to one over the insurgent, and who thereby
imply that the government force must be expanded, or outside
forces introduced, until that ratio is achieved. This is
nonsense.... The rise, or fall, in the ratio is one of the
indicators of how the war is going. Obviously a government
can expand its forces, but only within limits.... The real
crux is whether, while expanding, the government is at the
same time taking other action to ensure that the insurgent
rate of expansion is correspondingly slower so that the
favourable ratio is steadily improved. It is clearly better
to have a favourable ratio of five to one which is
improving, rather than a ratio of fifteen to one which is
declining. The magic figire of ten to one, therefore, is
not a prereguisite but an indicator. If it is reached on an
improving trend (or an initial higher ratio is maintained),
the government is en the way to victory, but if it is
reached on a declining tread, then the fault lies elsewhere
and will not be corrected by raising yet more forces. [ref.
173 ]
There is, of courss , the problem of counting rules.
If we compare manpower levels, should we ignore advantages
in superior equipment including helicopters? If we choose
to do better than compare gross inventories and instead
calculate forces that might actually oppose each other--
perhaps using one of the available quantified measures of
effectiveness— do the calculations adequately address human
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factors like leadership, training, loyalty, morale, and
tactics? How do we calculate advantages in intelligence,
communications, terrain, and differences in each side's
targets?
Alternatives to inventory cDapariscns are possible,
but except for some rough calculations of what constitutes
minimal or appropriate force levels, they are not especially
useful. T. E. Lawrence once calculated the troops that
Turkey would need to occupy Arabia--a calculation Lawrence
called "the algebraic factor.
"
In the Arab case the algebraic factor would take first
account of the area to be conquered. A casual calcula-
tion indicated perhaps 14 0,000 squire miles. How would
the Turks defend all that— no doubt by a trench line
across the bottom, if the Arabs were an army attacking
with banners d isplayed. . . but suppose they were an influ-
ence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or
back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like
plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished
through long stems to the head. The Arabs might be a
/apor, blowing where they listed. It seened that a
regular soldier might be helpless without a target. He
would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke
his rifle at. The next step was to estimate how many
posts they would need to contain this attacfe in depth,
sedition putting up her head in e/ery unoccupied one of
these 100,000 square miles. They would have need of a
fortified post every four square miles, and a post could
net be less than 20 men. The Turks would need 600,000
nen to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab
people. They had 100,000 men available. It seemed that
the assets in this sphere were with the Arabs, and
Climate, railways, deserts, technical weapons could also
be attached to their interests. The Turk was stupid and
would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and





Lawrence *s capabilities-versas-requireients analysis
is certainly entertaining, but not practical. The matter
seems to rest with Thompson's lesson. Provided that some
reasonably comprehensive criteria ace used to compute the
ratio, then the most significant point is whether that ratio
declines or grows. We might as well perform standard
manpower comparisons, with side calculations of fixed
reguirements and disparities in surveillance, transport, and
intelligence capabilities. For the government, the full-
time police should be counted. Tiey suffered 70% of the
security forces' casualties in Malays, and both there and in
Vietnam the police included field forces eguipped as light
infantry [ref . 1 72].
Also important are the trends within the forces and
the costs involved for each side. That is, is a favorable
trend due solely to government expansion (which cannot be
sustained indefinitely) , or are the insurgent forces at the
sane time slowing their growth or declining? Large armed
forces are extremely expensive to biild and maintain. Are
these costs bearable indefinitely? Hill a patron eventually
balk at the expense?
Factors 5i8_ani I^B, 2£.t5rnal aid, are rather
straightforward. As noted earlier, dependence upon a patron
imposes constraints upon the benefactor, and legitimacy
suffers if a relationship acquires the appearance of subser-
vience tc a foreign supplier. Of course, supply lines are
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vulnerable to interdiction. And although self-sufficiency
is touted as a virtue far guerrillas, they more often find
it a regretable necessity. mors often it is a necessity.
Legitimacy suffers from apparent subservience to a foreign
supplier.
2. Performance and Effect
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence,
legal/appropriate illegal/excessive
I
-, 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |
FACTOR 1-9. Tactics.
nonviolent paramilitary
A govern irent employing foroa illegally and exces-
sively sacrifices legitimacy. An insurgent force— whose
tactics regularly incluie terrorism and are, in any case,
illegal— must qualify as i paramilitary force in order to
challenge the governments forces.
There is great disagreement about the amount of
force a government shoull use in deterring or defeating an
insurgent challenge. Some scholars argue that heavy use of
force diminishes legitimacy and thus brings oa the insur-
gency. Chalmers Johnson and laloott Parsons belong here.
Others insist, that either light, or heavy use of force is
less likely to arouse resistance thai is some middle policy.
A government using little force probibly enjoys high legiti-
macy, and one resorting to excessive violence intimidates
its opponents, but in between is a condition of less
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legitimacy and less intimidation. Bwy and Gurr are among
the the believers here. Robert LeVine claims that consis-
tency is paramount. He concluded that colonial regimes in
Africa that were consistently repressive or permissive
encountered less anti-colonial violence than others with
ambivalent policies, [ref. 173]
Factor _G -9 argues that excessive force is disadvan-
tageous to the government. It also reflects Robert
Thompson's second principle of counter-insurgency.
The government must function in accordance with
law.... A government which does not act in accordance
with the law forfeits the right to be called a
government and cannot expect its people to obey the
law..
.
Action in accordance with the aw was a vital factor
during the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, where
Magsaysay made a reality of the constitution, and in
Malaya, where the civil oourts functioned normally
throughout the Emergency.
Some very tough laws were enaoted in Malaya. [But]
they were seen by the population to be effective and
were applied equally to all.
In the long term, adherence to the law is a great
advantage to the government.... It puts the government
in a position in which it is reprasented as a protector
of these who are innocent, and it puts the terrorists in
the position of oirminals. [ref. 174]
This amounts to use of coercion only so far as
legitimacy is not sacrificed, and in fact the Malayan
campaign (which Thompson halped to direct) succeeded with a
twin program of advancing the government's legitimacy and
coercive advantage. On the one hand, the security forces of
scie 21,000 at the start of the Emergency were increased to
121

a high of about 90,003, and a part-time home guard was
created— ultimately to nuioer ibout 250,000. [raf. 175] The
government buildup was coupled to insurgent decline, and as
noted earlier the government-insurgent troop ratio climbed
steadily. At the same time, tha novement toward Malayan
Independence, with such steps as tie Malayan-Chinese part-
nership to form the powerful Alliance Party led by
Malaysia's first prims ainister, gained legitimacy by
depriving tha insurgents of their nationalist appeal.
Factor G-9 marrias tha concspt of appropriate (not
excessive) use of force with that of legality. Tha two will
tend to coincide unless legality is reduced to only a tech-
nical adherence to the Letter of the law. Should the
analyst have to chose between these benchmarks, excessive
violence seems more harmful to the government cause than are
legal infractions.
Because the government usually enjoys military
superiority, Factor G-9 focuses on the appropriateness of
its use of force. For tha insurgents, on the other hand,
capabilities are more important. Its use of violence is, in
any case, illegal, and such distinctions as "selective"
versus "indiscriminate" tarrcrism tend to be difficult and
unproductive.
"Paramilitary" represents tha scale of organization
and support necessary to field combat units able to chal-
lenge those of the government. Farmers wielding pitchforks,
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saboteurs, and bandit gangs are all less than this.
Paramilitary units will have a military-style chain of
command, specialized organization that distinguishes between
combat and support personnel or units, and at least light
infantry weapons and tastiss. These characteristics evolve
over time, but any movement unable or not intending to
develop them does not qualify as an insurgent movement.
Paramilitary organization would resembla that of the
Huks in the Philippines as described by a former guerrilla.
The Huk was organizsi on the basis of squadrons,
composed of approximately 100 man aach. rhe squadron
was subdivided into platoons aid squads. On the
ascending scale, two squadrons male a battalion and two
battalions a regiment. In that raspect, we paralleled
fairly closely the ordinary army....
The squadron officers: oommandar, vice-ccramander
,
Dolitical instructor, supply officer, and intelligence
of f icer. . . . For avery Huk soldier ia the field there were
two others in reserve in the barrios, where tney engaged
in production work or ii civilian pursuits that other-
wise aided the overall struggle. ... Couriers were of two
types, the direct and tha relay. *ref. 176]
Kao Zedong's writings on gierrilla warfare are so
well known that we turn instead to Vo Nguyen Giap, the
Vietnamese military strategist, for an example of strategy.
From the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare,
oausing many difficulties and losses to the enemy, wears
him cut. To annihilate big enemy manpower aid liberate
land, guerrilla warfare has to mo/e gradually to mobile
iitilliiiii mobile warfare [is] a form of fighting in
which principles of regular warfare gradually appear and
increasingly develop but still bear a guerrilla char-
acter. Mobile warfa-e is tie fighting way of
concentrated troops, of the regular army, in which rela-
tively big forces are regrouped, operating on a
relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where
he is relatively exposed with a view to annihilating
enemy manpower, advanoing very deeply, then withdrawing
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very swiftly, possessing to the extreme, dynamism,
initiative, mobility ani rapidity Df decision in face of
new situations., .. In the coarse of the development of
mobile warfare, owing to the enemy's situation and ours
on the battlefields, eitrenched oamp warfare gradually
came into being. Entrenched caap warfare, which became
part and parcel of mobile warfare, kept developing and
occupied a more and more important position.
The conduct of the war must maintain a correct ratio
between the fighting forms, [ref. 177]
The scale with Factor 1-9 does not distinguish
between guerrilla and conventional forces, both of which are
paramilitary, in order to avoid misleading. Premature
commitment to conventional tact ics--3 uch as positional, or
Giap's "entrenched camp" rfarfare--may invite destruction by




Section VI concludes the paper with three illustrations
of the framework and worksheets for future applications.
A. ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MALAYA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND
MOZAMBIQUE
The first illustration is a detailed, factor-by-factor
examination of an historical cise offering relatively
complete and reliable information. The Malayan "Emergency"
of 1948 through 1960 is evaluated twice to show that trends
among the factors may be more significant than their abso-
lute values at any given time. rhe next two examples are
current situations. They are the laoist and Muslim move-
ments in the Philippines and the Soath African-backed group
in Mozambigue. Recognizing the limitations of the available
information, these current examples are brief a^i summary.
The illustrations serve two purposes. First, they
demonstrate use of the methodolog/ . For example, the
Malayan case is examine! at the begining of the armed
uprising and reexamined aine years later at independence.
Although an intelligence analyst wcild use a shorter time-
frame and more specific facts, he still would use the
framework as shown here.
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The second purpose hare is to tsst the methodology's
influence in shaping tha outcome. Does the process of sepa-
rately evaluating twenty-sight faotors and conbining those
judgements into three govarnment-insurgent balances intro-
duce undesirable effects? To evaluate this with some
precision, the illustrations mathamatically combine the
factor judgements. (Nota: a user need not do so.) Tha
results suggest that—ia addition to simplifying tha analyt-
ical process--the procedure also dra*s implications from tha
individual factors and contributes unexpected insights.
1 . The_Mala ian_"Emarg.a ncy." _119U3-1,96 0}_
The twelve-year, unsuocessf il insurgency in Malaya
is considered by many authorities to be "the perfect
exemplar of counter-sib version or counter-insurgency
warfare." [ref. 178] The first assessment (latter "A" or.
tha scales in Figures 6.5 and 5.6) is as of June 19U8, the
month the armed uprising began. The situation is reexamined
as cf August 19 57 (letter "B/1 or simply "A' 1 if no change
has occurred), when Malaya achieved independence.
Factor 5-1 (Calculations: iiitial 9, subsequent 8).
The composition of Malaya's population was the lost critical
determinant of the course :f the insurgency. In 19U8 ^hree
communities— Malay, Chinese, and Indian— lived apart from
each other, worked at different occupations, spoke different
languages, followed separate religions and customs, and were
represented by different political organizations.
125

FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.
or many
| 1 2 3 a 5 6^7--
FACTOR S-2. Ma ss-El_ite_Gj
same % as___23455789 |
FACTQR ilFT:—gg4»ana&aralltiteracti3n«
mir.imal/cont rolled s-x-s-m sjjjie/uncoa trolled
| 1 ^ ^< <<<<<<<<<<< <<<<««<<<<<«<<j
FACTOR S-4. \Peasant MDbiiizati:
exit option N * vulnerable
j 1 2 "V^?"" 5 6 7 8 9 |
FACTOR IG-1 . L^ader^i^^^ (Note dual scales}
unitary (GDvernrnilTt-K^^^ diffused
| 1 2 i4<««<«««<<<Tr^Av 8 9 |hostile rivals ^(Insurgent) roope\ative unitary
FACTOR IG-2. Political^ Mobility.
open (SJ \ blocked
| 12 3 4 5 ;>B<< <<<<<<<<<<£* 9
blocked ^ fl> ^^
FACTOR IG-3. Loyal, t^.
intact ^ "• (G) ^-^ defections
| 1 B-< <<<<<<«« <«i^^' 5 7 8 9
"returnees",N <::»
Y





2 0% 3 0J5
determined
6orn<i0%










FACTOR IG-5. Perf6r man ce.
effective / (G)







Figure 6.1 Insurgency ia Malaya, 1948 & 1957 (continues).
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Figure 6.2 Malayan Insurgeicy (continued) .
A number of cleavages reinforced ethnicity to form
an unstable society of three primary communities. The Malay
elite generally monopolized whatavsr government positions
xhe British colonials did not reserve for themselves, and
the Chinese and Indian elites controlled the greater share
of the country's wealth and economic power. Non-elite
Malays tended to live in raral areas, engaging in lew-income
agriculture, while higher percentages of Chinese and Indians
123

lived in urban areas as shop keepers and wage laborers. Tha
Chinese and Indians also lived in homogeneous groups in
barracks at the tin mines and rubber plantations.
GOVERNMENT/I NSORGENT BALANCES
ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCE
government advantaga insurgent advantage






government advantage insurgent advantage
j t 2 3 B«<<<««<«<<<> 7 8 9 j
'COERCIVE BALANCE
government advantage / insurgent advantage
j -, 2 3 3<<«<««<A/ 5 7 8 9 I
June 19 4 8, A ugust 1957
Date Worksheet Completed
Figure 6.3 Malaya: 3o vera ment- Ins argent Balances.
The plural society presented difficulties for the
insurgents, whose appeal was limited to the Chinese. [ref.
183] In the rural areas where the guerrillas were, the popu-
lace was largely Malay. Ihe potentially sympathetic Chinese
tended tc be found in 310:2 urban surroundings. Moreover,
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Percent of Population Number (in thousands)
1947 1957 1947 1957
Malay 49.5% 49.3% 2,428 3,125
Chinese 38.4 37.2 1,335 2,33U
Indian 10.8 11.7 531 735
[ref. 179]
Figure 6.4 Ethnic Composition of Malayan Society.
although clandestine organization among the Chinese was
facilitated by ths existence of numerous tightly-knit secret
societies [ref. 181], it was hinderad by the fact that they
spoke nine mutually unintelligible dialects and tended to
settle in villages and oommunities having little contact
with their neighbors. [ref. 132]
The three-part character of Malayan society did not
change substantially in only twelve years, but a number of
developments associate! with the insurgency and Malaya's
progress toward independence provided some impetus toward
integration. (The significant direction of change is indi-
cated on the scale by the small movement from the initial
position "A" to the later "E." ) Auong these developments
was the partnership between the 'Jnited Malayan National
Organization (UMND) and the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA) to form the Alliance Party. Victorious in the
elections of 1952, the Alliance expanded to take in the
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) and achieve even greater
success in the elections of 1955. * ref . 183] Moreover, by
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1952 about one-third of the Chinese had become citizens of
Malaya, and in that year the ruling sultans further relaxed
the requirements [ref. 18'4], Finally, the expansion of the
armed forces and police— multiracial except for the army's
single Malay R egiment--tended to pull the communities
together.
Factor S-2 (Calculations performed for the ethnic
Chinese as the group most likely to support the insurgents:
initial and subsequent 0). Already limited ethnically to
only 40 percent of the population, the potential support
base for the insurgents farther diminished due to the afflu-
ence of the Chinese upper and middla classes. For example,
between 80 and 90 peccant of aiL private employers in
Malaysia as the the 1970s were Chinase [ref. 185]--a fact
that had probably changei only littLe since the Emergency,
and the income ior a Chiiase family was roughly twice that
cf a Malay household. *rsf, 13 6]
The absence of a mass-elite gap did not mean,
however, that all Chinese were content. Father, those who
were better off were nor attracted to the cause, and the
insurgents' principal supporters included only the poorer
Chinese— the 500,000 to 5 00,000 sguatters living on the
fringe of the urban areas.
Factor s-3 (Calculations: iaitial 9, subsequent 2).
Urban-rural interaction in Malaya in 1947 was generally
unhindered and more extsnsive than in most third- world
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countries. Malaya enjoys! the highest per capita standard
of living in Asia [ref. 187] and the emphasis on export
crops and mining had lead to the development of a good road
network and a railroad in the populated areas. The
remainder of the country— dense and mountainous jungle— was
inhabited by some 50,003 to 100,003 aborigines who were not
a significant factor in the insurgency.
Urban-rural interaction changed dramatically in the
early 1950s with the start of "Operation Starvation." These
population controls were effective ia cutting the guerrillas
off from their sources of food and other supplies.
Factor S-4 (Calculations: initial and subsequent 3).
About three-quarters of the peasant rice farmers and fish-
ermen were Malays [ref. 133]. Ethnically alienated from the
insurgents, they were also content in their traditional,
subsistence economy and preferred to avoid involvement in
the movement. Most rural Chinese, on the other hand, were
wage laborers on the rubber plantations. Therefore, the
great majority of the rural inhabitants had an "exit
option. "
Factor IG- 1 (Calculations; initial government 5,
insurgent 9; subsequent government 1, insurgent 5).
(Averaging the paired values, "A" i= placed at 7 and "5" at
3.) Government authority intiaily was diffused, but it
became greatly concentrated during the early /ears of the
insurgency. Each of the nine Mala/ states was ruled by a
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local sultan advised by a British official. Ths settlements
of Penang and Malacca were ruled directly by British offi-
cers of the Malayan civil service. The elevsn states all
came under the Federal Government hsaded by a British High
Commissioner. With the appointment of General Templer as
High Commissioner in 1952, the powers of that office greatly
increased. Additionally, a Federal Jar Council, composed of
key cabinet officials ani service representatives, sparei
the full cabinet from considering most decisions. Finally,
a Director of Operations -/as granted sweeping authority for
the day-to-day conduct of the effort. [ref. 189]
The insurgent leadership was headed by Chin Peng ani
the Party Central Comnittee. Chii remained the supreme
leader throughout, but tha situation required organizing the
gusrrillas into eight isolated and virtually autonomous
regiments [ref. 190]. By the mid-1950s, groups of guer-
rillas were defecting together, and the high command seemei
increasingly irrelevant.
Factor IG~2 (Calculations: initial government 9,
insurgent 8; subsequent government 3, insurgent 8). The
Chinese (as the critical group herei enjoyed little regi.ii3
access in 1948, but their o ppor tunit i =?s grew with the exten-
sion of citizenship and the alliance between 0MNO and the
MCA. Insurgent access remained relatively open throughout.
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Factor IG-3 (Calcu lations: initial government 1,
insurgent 9; subsequent government 1, insurgent 3). Unless
the initial guerrillas are regarded as defectors from the
government, neither side suffered from poor discipline and
loyalty at first. By 1954, wh = n high guerrilla leaders
Osnan China and Hor Leung defected and then induced others
to cross over [ref. 191] the insurgents were defecting regu-
larly. In 1955, for example, thsre were 245 surrenders
reported as against 362 insurgents killed and 56 captured.
[ref. 192] While the government soore remained constant,
that for the insurgents dropped.
Facto r
t
S-5 (Caloula tions: initial 5, subsequent 3).
Accurate figures on landlassness ars Lacking, but the level
definitely fell when ths Ciinese wees resettled and for the
first time given title to taeir property (they had not
erjoyed tenure earlier). Extrapolating from available data,
we come to the very rough calculations that iandlessness was
reduced from about 30% in 1943 to just under 20% in 1957.
[r=f. 193] However, land ownership »as not a strong motiva-
tion for the Chinese in Malaya, who tended to be more
interested in other invest n ents.
Z^cTor_s^6 (Calculations: initial 3, subsequent 3).
Differential modernization was polarizing initially. A dual
economy of traditional subsistence farming and modern export
agriculture and mining was much in evidence, and the Chinese
squatters and Malay farners vers the most neglected.
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Resettlement in the New Viilages--complete with better
housing, running water, electricity, and other services--
greatly improved conditions for the Chinese. Additionally,
expenditures for rural development were increased, and
foreign nurses and teaohers volunteered to bring their
skills to the Malayan countryside.
Factor_IG-U (Calculations: initial government 19,
insurgent 8; subsequent governuent 5, insurgent 3). Young's
scale for government identity would identify colonial Malaya
as a "type 1" colony in 194 8, becoming a "type 4" arbitrary
colonial unit with indigenous successors to power in 1957.
The insurgents 1 identity blended a nationalistic, anticolo-
nial appeal (by a group that had been in the forefront of
resistance to the Japanese) with a narrower Chinese commu-
nist ideology. If we rate this mixture highly during the
early period (on the strength of its nationalism and antico-
lonialism) , it must drop substantially with the grant of
independence in 1957.
Factor IGi5 (Caici lations: initial government 8,
insurgent 2; subsequent government 4, insurgent 2).
Government performance i.i the rural areas was initially
ineffective primarily because the British did so little to
integrate the Chinese aid Indians into Malayan national
life. For example, no schools were provided for the
Chinese, who had to establish their own. The situation
changed, of course, with resettlement of the squatters and

the other measures described with Factor S-6 above. The
insurgents, however, never established a single "liberated
area," and the jungle arsas they occupied contained only a
few aborigines.
Factor S -7 (Calculations: initial and subsequent 5).
Lacking a history of empire , and with the Malay stereotyped
as lazy, Malaya nonetheless experiences communal violence
and has a history of piracy, k neutral score is advised.
Factor S-8 (Calculations: initial 8, subsequent 2).
The armed struggle having begun, Factor S-8 calculates the
arms and military skills available to the insurgents rather
than including those of bDth sides. In Malaya in 1948, the
insurgents had ample stocks of arms and possessed consider-
able military skills. The core of the movement was the
5,000 cr so guerrillas of the Malayan Peoples* Anti- Japanese
Army trained and equipped ay the British commando Force 136.
Arms had been cached in trie jungle for use after World War
Two ended. However, only a month after the uprising began,
Chin Peng's military strategist Lau Yew was shot. 3ritish
intelligence and police oosrations sought out arms and guer-
rillas, and rewards and amnesty wers effective in depleting
the insurgents' ranks and arsenals. Robert Thompson's
figures for weapons lost and recovered by the government
show a steady drain froa the guerrillas. [ ref . 194]
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Factor S -9 (Calculi tions: iaitial 2, subsequent 5).
Malaya had 1,000 miles of coastline but only 150 miles of
border. There was nsvac any evidence of supply to the
insurgents by sea, and the Thai frontier was not a factor in
the early years. In 1953, Chin Peng and his group fled to
Thailand and led the movement from Thai soil thereafter.
Thus, while the border was unimportant initially, it did
provide sanctuary for the insurgent leadership and the
several hundred guerrillas who ultimately followed. An
observer might have given this factor a low value early on,
but he would have had to upgrade it later. Thus, this is
the only factor which appears to show movement in a direc-
tion favoring the insurgents, and without Thai sanctuaries
the remaining guerrillas would long ago have disappeared.
Facto r
,
S-10 (Calculations: initial and subsequent
8). Malaya offers rough terrain and good concealment in the
jungle areas where guerrilla base canps often escaped detec-
tion for years. 3ut the populated areas offer good access
to government forces. On balance, the terrain favored the
insurgents.
Factor IG-6 (Ca lea iations: initial government 8,
insurgent 1; subsequent governnent 3, insurgent 1).
Government population control initially was weak.. Later it
became quite strong with the imposition of "Operation
Starvation," the expansion of the security forces, and other





Factor IG-7 (Calculations: initial 7.5, subsequent
0) . According to Robert Thompson, the government-to-
insurgent troop ratio was about 5-to-1 when the uprising
began, and it grew steadily as the government forces
expanded faster than did the insurgents. In time, the
insurgents' strength began to decline. By 1957, the ratio
was probably in exzess of 2 0-to-1. [ ref . 195]
Factor IS- 8 (Calci lations: initial government 8,
insurgent 0; subsequent government 4, insurgent 0). The
insurgents never received significant external aid. The
government enjoyed increasing support from Britain.
Factor IS- 9 (Calculations: initial government 3,
insurgent 9; subsequent government 2, insurgent 7).
Although the British and the Malayan government used
increasing force as the buildup got mderway, they took care
to observe the law and to avoid excessive violence. The
courts functioned normally throughout. Tough laws were
passed, but they were generally perceived as necessary and
were not abused. Civilian control for the most parr limited
the military means used. [ref. 195] For their par-, the
guerrillas remained a paramilitary force, but their forma-
tions dwindled. Their image also suffered from the
indescriminat e use of terrorisn.
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2. Maoists and Muslims in the .Philippines Today
The Philippines today faces two simultaneous insur-
gent threats. The Maoist New Peoples 1 Army (N?A) formed in
1959 from remnants of the earlier auk movement. It is most
active today in the Visayar Islands, especially on the
island of Samar. [ ref . 197] Lande, "Philippine Prospects
After Martial Law, p. 1157. The Muslim National Liberation
Front (MNLF) on Mindanao aid the Sulu Islands seeks autonomy
from the Christian government in Manila. Except for an
uneasy ceasefire in the mid-1970s, the MNLF has been in
armed rebellion since 1972. Its basic grievances date back
to Spanish rule in the 16th Century.
With this case we are at the mercy of incomplete
information, and the uio lassified sources examined are
frequently contradictory. Hotly debated are the legitimacy
of the Marcos regime and the effectiveness of land reform
and development efforts. For purposes of illustration, each
faotor is evaluated regardless of the adequacy of the data.
In this regard, the author was mors comfortable indicating
judgements on the factor scale as a short range of values
rather than with single points suggestive of precision.
Wherever possible, the apparent crend was indicated by
arrows (i.e., "»>"). When there was no apparent trend,
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Figure 6.5 Philippine Insurgency, 1982 (continues) .
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Figure 6.6 Philippine Insurgency (continued).
The Philippines are a culturally diverse state with
a variety of bases for differentiating groups. The popula-
tion divides ethnically into four major groupings (i.e.,
Tagaloq, Ilocano, Visayans, and Muslims), it fragments
regionally as a result of the 7,100 islands, and it is prone
to political factions based upon strong patron-client
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Figure 6.7 Philippine Government-Insurgent Balances,
Muslims, for instiace, see themselves as a single
group only with regard to non-Muslims. Otherwise, they
consider themselves to be rausugs, Maranaos, and
Maguindanaos. [ ref . 193]
Revolutionary movements in the Philippines have
tended to be concentrated regionally. The Huks, for
example, ccuid not attract much support outside of the
Papangan area of central Luzon, a region of dense population
and wet rice agriculture "ref. 199]. This same area is the
heartland of the pro-Moscow faction of Filipino communists,
who have cooperated with the government since the communist
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party schism in the 1963s " ref. 203]. The Maoist NPA finds
its support elsewhere. Tie reports of NPA attacks in more
than half of the provinces of the Philippines over recent
years signal a disturbing new trend [ref. 201], although
support for the insurgents may not be substantial in most
areas.
The fluid, bipolar political system is considered
the most powerful inhibiter of ethnic mobilization [ref.
202 ], and it is in areis whare tie patronage system has
decayed that rebellion becomes most likely. Forces for
integration of Philippine society include Christianity
(practiced by over 90^ of the population), the Filipino and
English languages (spoken by over 53£ and some 40% of the
people respectiveiy--figur as that: ara rising rapidly) , and
possibly by the migrations from o ver-populat ed areas to
primarily Mindanao [ref. 23 3].
The Manila government is laminated by Ilocanos,
including the President, and other groups are generally
underrepresented in the national elite [ref. 204].
President Marcos is an astute politician who at times
co-opts leaders of opposition groups (e.g., the pro-Soviet
coimunisxs and the Muslins) thus reducing -he apparent
discrimination.
Among the remaining factors contributing to the
organizational balance, urban-rural links presumably came
under greater government oontrol following the imposition of
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martial law in 1972. Although martial law formally ended in
January 1981, most measures ia the areas of unrest remained
in effect. Most rural Filipinos do not have a true "exit
option." They tend to be employed at sharecropping or wage
labor, dependent upon a patron. Resettlements and land
reforms may be reducing the vulneraoility of at least some
of the Filipino rice and corn farmers.
Government leadership has become increasingly
concentrated, especially inder martial law. The President
appealed directly to the people via popular referendums and
used the mandate he obtained to orange the bureaucracy's
structure and distribution of power. Meanwhile, rumours
circulate that the various rebellious groups are coordi-
nating their operations, but the inhsrent incompatibility of
con muni sm and islam suggests that the NPA and the MNLF will
not reconcile their differences to the extent of close coop-
eration. Potential sources of insurgent leadership include
the Catholic parish priests, but Marcos has so far success-
fully manipulated threats to church interests to limit the
ant igovernment activity by the priests. [ref. 235]
Meanwhile, access into a government dominated by the
President and a few key fanilies is probably less than that
offered to insurgent recruits. Insurgent strength appears




Loyalty to Presideit Marcos suffered from reactions
to martial law, but a series of insirger.t defections in the
1970s (primarily from the MNLF) suggssts a government advan-
tage here [ref, 206]. The ending :> f martial law last year
may repair some of the daaage to loyalty and discipline.
Economic conditions are harmful to government legit-
imacy. Roy Prosterman cDisiders ceatral Luzon to be one of
the five worst areas in the world in terms of land pressure
[ref. 207], and economic developnent has been extremely
polarizing. The "trickle down" distribution method has
showered new wealth upon the already rich, while development
projects bring added suffering to maiy rural poor.
The damming of some mountain valleys in northern Luzon
for hydroelectric development, oie of Marcos' s World
Bank-supported efforts to meet the energy crisis, has
brought with it... displacements. These distant devel-
opments have attracted little nDcice in Manila. But
several of these remote localities and, more generally,
the economically most depressed regions of the country -
the Cagayan Valley, the Bicol, tie eastern and central
Visayas, and northern Mindanao - have become redoubts
and recruitment areas for the Maoist New People's Army,
which finds them, as the late Chairman put it, friendly
waters in which to swim. [ref. 233]
Mindanao, home of the Muslims, has only meager government
services and the worst roads in the Philippines. And before
1967, there was only one high school in the entire Sulu
Island chain [ref. 209]. On the other hand, government
performance in the rural ireas has genuinely improved under
President Marcos. He his built roads and developed other




The most glaring government deficiency affecting
legitimacy concerns identity. Most Filipinos were upset
when martial law ran roughshod over democratic principles
long established in the islands.
The Philippines' s traditional level of violence is
another factor that is difficult to judge. Filipinos are
little given to political demonstrations and mass violence.
Individually, however, thsy can be hot-tempered. Until the
confiscation of privately- owned firiarms began in 1972, a
"wild West" atmosphere prevailed. The confiscation has
noticeably reduced levels of violent crime, although it
stimulated Muslim resistance.
The Philippines, of course, lacks land borders with
another country, but arnts have long been funneled to the
Muslims by boat from Malaysian Sabah. MNL? guerrillas train
thare as well. Althougn the training and arms deliveries
diminished markedly after a key Malaysian official in Sabah
was remcved in 1975, they do continue. [ref. 210]
Meanwhile, Manila enjoys substantial U.S. military aid
provided in return for continued access to Philippine mili-
tary bases. The aid has anabled a guadruppling of the size
of the armed forces since 1972. Aoout 130,003 active-duty
army and air force troops today [ref. 211] confront 3,000 to
7,300 guerrillas of the NPA and 15,333 to 20,003 fighters of
the MNL? [ref. 212].
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The confiscation of fireams and other measures
induced a resurgence of tha Muslim rssistance in 1972- Half
of the Filipino army reportedly is deployed in the south
combatting the paramilitary NP& and MNLF. Casualties have
been high among government troops, iisurgents and civilians.
The revocation of martial law suggests a trend toward
graater legality and appropriateness in. the government's use
of force.
Each factor on ths- worksheet was evaluated according
to this general view of the Philippine situation, and the
factor values were averaged to conpute the organization,
legitimacy, and coercion balances. The results reflect an
understandably "close call," the insurgent forces seemingly
enjoy a slight advantaga now but the trends favor the
government. The greatest advantage to the insurgents lies
with the legitimacy balance, which accords with the view
that Marcos did damage to the government cause by declaring
martial law.
By the close of the decade, though some still spoke
favorably of the regine and many others had lost
interest in politics, prevailing opinion among the
aducated stratum had shifted decisively against both the
President and ntartiai law, and a widespread desire to
see them go was clearly avident. Fhere was a new appre-
ciation, among thoughtful Filipinos, of the value of
checks and balances. Both the moderate aad Marxist
opposition leaders meanwhile had risen again in public
favor, not because paople beliaved that they could
govern more ably than Marcos, but because thair courage
in opposing hi id publicly cast them as the only available
instruments for removing him from power. The opposition
was new joined by members of the clargy. [ref. 213]
1U7

How much this has changed with the end of the declaration is
unclear, but certainly the martial law situation improved
the government's coercive capabilities.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no clear government
advantage indicated with the organization and coercion
balances. Completing this evaluation as though there were
only two sides to the str uggle--inst ead of the -Three that
exist— may have accorded a greater advantage to the insur-
gents than they deserve. A more realistic evaluation would
entail separate calculations for the NPA and the MNLF.
As this evaluation stands, it suggests a short-term
stalemate with a longer-term expectation of government
recovery. The many developments that, could reverse that
outcome call for regular attention to the situation.
3- Ins urgency . in Mozambique .Today
In 1975, Mozambique ended ten years of anticolonial
struggle and became independent of Portugal. The
Marxist-Leninist independence movement FRELIMO, which had
long occupied the country's northernmost two provinces, took
over the entire country. Soon the white, anti-communist
regime in neighboring Rhodesia began organizing an
anti-FRELIMO armed movement, the Mozambique National
Resistance (MNR). Initial recruits included a group of
former colonial soldiers
—
Mozambicans trained by the
Portuguese as ccunter-guerriila troops. When white-ruled
Rhodesia became black-governed Zimbabwe in 1979, the MNR
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Figure 6.9 Mozambique National Resistance (continued).
Iost: its patron and sanctuaries. Reportedly, the South
Africans stepped in and have sines then trained, equipped,
resupplied, and even lei SNR units [ref. 214].
Mozambique has an ethnically diverse population of
"12 major and over 34 lasser tribas," [ref. 215] Ethnic
divisions reportedly are lot strong--cooperation and inter-
marriage being common among neighboring qroups--but there





government advantage insurgent advantage
| 1 2 3 4+*f++ 5 7 8 9
LEGITIMACY/EFFICIENT? BALANCE
government advantage / insurgent advantage112 3 + +<*+ 5 5 7 8 9 |
CDSRZIVE BALANCE
government advantage \. insurgent advantage
I 1 2 3 U 5 5*V* + 7 8 9 I
December, 198 2
Date Worksheet Completed
Figure 6.10 Mozambique Government-Insurgent Balances.
reportedly aims its appeals at the Shona-speakers (about 1055
of the population) and emphasizes ethnic themes. It points
out, accurately, that FRELIMO is dominated by non-Shona
southerners—especially the Ihongi, seme 253 of the
popuiaticn--and that Marxist FRELIMO is destructive of
traditional Shor.a values and customs including polygamy,
bride price, and ancestor worship. The MNR's potential base
cf support, the Shona, aould appear to be underr epresented
among the Mozambican elite. [ref. 216]
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The HUB operates in isolated areas of south-central
and western Mozambique. Villagers there are mostly subsis-
tence farmers possessing a true "exit option" and few ties
to the cities or the government. Mozambique is among
Africa's poorest countries, and ths rural infrastructure is
extremely weak.
Government leadership is the hands of President
Saaora Machel and the Party Central Zommittee, but a series
of involuntary demobilizations and purges suggest less than
harmony within the party. The upper leadership appears
unified, although reassignments (reportedly to strengthen
"Party work" and separata it froi the government bureauc-
racy) have led to speculation of demotions [ref. 217], MNR
authority is likewise concentrated in a single individual,
but the power struggle after the former top official was
killed in 1979 suggests that significant rivalries exist
[rsf. 218]. Reportedly, South African direction is firm and
obeyed.
Judging from tie in volui tary demobilizations,
FRELIMO probably offers lass upward mobility today than do
the insurgents. There is evidence of coerced recruitment,
but the MNR's growth since 1976 to a force of 3,300 to 5,000
guerrillas is impressiva. A European hostage, later
released, reports having seen about 1,000 insurgent troops
at the two camps where he * as held, and he noted that well-




The steady stream of disaffected people defecting
from FRELIMO to the MNR includes three distinct groups. The
first were those who had opposed FRELIMO during colonial
times and dared not remain where they wera after
Independence. Next wars those wio were forced out of
FRELIMO. Most recently, the cross-overs have been people
who simply could not get aheid in the government. [ref.
220 ]
Mozambique^ poverty and underdevelopment. are
serious obstacles to listing legitimacy for FRELIMO.
Landlessness is probably not a significant problem in rural
areas because unused land remains available to anyone
willing to clear and use it. Differential modernization has
been polarizing, however. The Portuguese developed mines,
plantations, and the urban areas, but ignored most of the
countryside. FRELIMO has been unable to change the pattern
of neglecting the subsistence sector, although the army may
now be engaging in civic action projects. Any advantage
acruing to the insurgents from government neglect may be
lost if the reported MNR terrorism against civilians is
widespread. [ref. 221]
Mozambique is an "arbitrary colonial unit with
indigenous successors to pcwer'^-foung 1 s "type 4" with
Factor IG-U— and the MNR has no strong ideological appeal
beyond anticommunism and traditional Shona values. Neither




After ten years of guerrilla warfara against the
Portuguese, the traditional level of violanoe might be
assumed to be high. This is tampers!, however, by the peas-
ant's usual passivity. There certainly appear to be ampls
arms available, and tha South Africans and the Soviets are
willing to provide more.
Sanctuaries, no longer available in Zimbabwe, now
exist in South Africa. Additional guerrilla units are
basing from Malawi, but it is not clear if these units
belong to the M NR or to a separata group known as Africa
Livre [ ref . 222]. Roads are poor, tla terrain is relatively
gentle, and the predominant grasslands provide adeguate
concealment. That the guarrillas can move about in groups
of 300 seems to confirm this jadgema^t.
Government control is assumed to be weak with the
country still recovering from cha long anticolonial
struggle. Machel's tougri line ("onLy those who work hava a
right to eat" [ref, 223]) and the FRSLIHO reductions suggest
a measure of control ovar parts of tia country.
Estimates of guarriila strangth ara inevitably
suspect, but the MNR is believed to number some 3,000 to
5,300 personnel. Against this, the government's 23,600
ground and air forces yiald about a S-to-1 advantage [ref.
22'4 ]. FR2LIM0 reportedly is arming urban militia and has
recalled 1,500 guerrilla veterans, so the affactive ratio
may be increasing "ref- 225], Both sides seem to have ampla
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external aid. The government's use of violence appears to
b? legal and appropriate, especially since the MUR camps
they have attacked were in sparsely populated areas. The
MNR is clearly a paramilitary o rganization ; its image may
have suffered from the use of tsrrorism.
The results of this avaluatioQ suggest a FR2LIM0
advantage in legitimacy and a somewhat more signifioant MNR
edge in coercion. Organization shows a slight plus for
FRELIMO. Should the MNR develop its comparative advantage,
expanding in strength and iioreasing the scope of its
operations against the government, FREL.I30 is certain to
feel threatened. If the insurgent coercive advantage is as
significant as suggested here, FSELIMO sight be forced tc
call for stepped up Soviet ail and a somaitment of Cuban
trccps sooner than many observers expect.
B. WORKSHEETS: FACTORS ARRANGED BY INSURGENT PHASE
The worksheets below nay be ussi with tha first
three phases cf an insurgency. No additional factors, and





— Near left, govacnment advantage.
Near right, insurgent aivantage. -->
Change Ovar Time
<
— Toward the left, insurgent victory less likely.
Toward the right, insurgant victory mors likely. -->
1. PRE-EMERGENT STAGE. Gauging potential for
insurgency and predicting appearanca of a movement.
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.
or many 2 or 3
FACrOR S-2. Mass-Elite Sao.
sama % as population 0% |
FACTOR S-3. arban-Rural Iateraction.
minimal/controlled extensivs /uncontrolled I A
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 | I N
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization. I I
exit option vulnerable I Z
FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.
unitary diffused | I
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9
| |





-j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 |
Figure 6.11 Worksheet 1: Pre-Eaergent Paase (continues) .
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FACTOR S-5. Landlessne ss.
20% 30fc 40$ 60% | L
j
<j 2 3| 4 | 6 |7 8 9 | | E
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.
equitable highly polarizing | I
,
-i
2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
| | T
FACTOR G-4. Origin & Indigenous Authority. | I87 6 54 3 2 1 | H
, 1( 2--I-3 | 5| 6— | -7 8|— -9 1 | A
FACTOR G-5. Rural Services. I C
effective ineffective | Y
j
-, 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
|
•H
FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.
low high
,
<| 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 |




2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9
1
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.
impenetrable /none porous /plentiful
j -j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | |
FACTOR S-10. Terrain > Liaes of Communications. |
cpen/good rough/poor
FACTOR G-6. Control. C
totalitarian weak
I
-j 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | | 3
FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces S Police. N
strong weak
FACTOR G-8. External Aid.
unneeded plenty some none
I
-i 2 | 3 4 5 5 7 | 8 9 |
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.
legal/appropriate illegal /excessive
j
Figure 6.12 SJsrksheet 1 (continued).
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Pigure 6.13 Worksheet 2: Noaviolant Phase (continues).
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FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.
low high
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Figure 6.15 Worksheet 3: Araed Struggle (continues).
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Figure 6.16 Worksheet 3 (continued).
T?
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